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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Any time you go through a process of major social change, 
you have four stages of response.  The first is anger; the second is 
retribution; the third is grudging acceptance.  In the fourth stage, 
people all of a sudden get it . . . .”1 
While this quote by Donna Lopiano is related to the 
acceptance of women in sports and the effect of Title IX, it could 
apply equally to the response of legislatures and courts to domestic 
violence over the last twenty-five years.  Given the historical 
condonation of such violence by the U.S. legal system, we are 
indeed going through a process of major social change as we 
advocate for the same system to take a stand against domestic 
violence.  In the custody arena, laws first allowing, then mandating 
that courts consider domestic abuse, and most recently creating 
presumptions against batterers as custodial parents, have met with 
very mixed results.  While some states seem to have made this 
transition without significant problems, other states have seen a 
backlash in the courts’ response to such presumptions. 
This article will examine the effect of state statutes creating a 
rebuttable presumption against custody to batterers.  Part II will 
trace the development of these presumption statutes, situating 
them within historical trends in custody law.  Part III will describe 
the statutes, including how they vary.  Part IV will examine how the 
presumption statutes are being implemented, including the 
backlash seen in some jurisdictions.  Part V will propose solutions 
to problems with implementation of presumption statutes.  These 
include legislative amendments; training for judges, attorneys, 
guardians ad litem, mediators, and evaluators; seeking clarification 
from appellate courts; funding for attorneys for indigent victims of 
 
 1. Bill Blum, Fighting Over Title IX, CAL. LAW. Feb. 2001, at 90 (quoting 
Donna Lopiano, Executive Director, Women’s Sports Foundation). 
2
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domestic violence; and community organizing.  The conclusion, 
Part VI, notes that while the passage of such statutes is not a “quick 
fix” to the fundamental problems presented by these cases, the 
process of enactment and implementation of the presumption 
statutes is worthwhile, as another step on the long road toward the 
elimination of domestic violence. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION STATUTES 
A.  Historical Custody Standards 
Until the 1970s and the advent of no-fault divorce, abuse by 
one parent of the other was considered quite relevant to custody 
decisions throughout the United States, as this was evidence of the 
abuser’s poor morals.2  While the rate of divorce was low, victims of 
domestic violence were usually awarded custody of the parties’ 
children.3 
A significant change in custody decisions took place in the 
1970s, as most U.S. states amended their divorce laws from fault-
based divorce to no-fault divorce.4  Under the new regime, 
domestic violence was no longer seen as relevant by divorce courts; 
judges were trained to look toward the future, not admit evidence 
of past misdeeds, and to consider the parents as generally equally 
qualified to be custodians of children.5  Unless the children were 
physically harmed, what a husband did to his wife6 was not seen as 
relevant to his ability to parent.7 
No-fault divorce was generally hailed as a progressive move, 
 
 2. Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images Of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic 
Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (1991). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  See also Note, Developments in the Law: Legal Response to Domestic Violence, 
VI. Battered Women and Child Custody Decisionmaking, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1597 
(1993). 
 5. Lynne R. Kurtz, Protecting New York’s Children: An Argument for the Creation 
of a Rebuttable Presumption Against Awarding a Spouse Abuser Custody of a Child, 60 
ALB. L. REV. 1345, 1347 (1997). 
 6. While domestic violence can be committed by either sex, most domestic 
violence is committed by men against women.  The U.S. Dept. of Justice reported 
in 1998 that a woman is seven to fourteen times more likely to be severely injured 
by an intimate than a man is.  Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Full Report of the 
Prevalence, Incidence, and Consequences of Violence Against Women: Findings From the 
National Violence Against Women Survey, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, at 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/172837.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2001). 
 7. Cahn, supra note 2, at 1044; Kurtz, supra note 5, at 1347. 
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both by feminists and by fathers’ rights groups.8  Fathers’ rights 
groups celebrated this as a move away from what they saw as gender 
bias, whereby mothers were allegedly awarded custody solely by 
virtue of their sex.  However, the emphasis on no longer making 
findings of fault set the stage for courts refusing to consider 
domestic violence as a relevant factor in custody decisions.  
Domestic violence was not seen as affecting the best interests of the 
child unless the child was also physically abused.9  And even though 
the overlap between partner abuse and physical child abuse is 
great,10 courts often failed to acknowledge this connection in 
making custody decisions.11 
B.  Move To Allow, Then Require Courts To Consider Domestic 
Violence In Custody Decisions 
 By the 1980’s, the domestic violence movement had become a 
vocal presence, and was developing some sophistication in terms of 
changing entrenched policies.  Advocates began to call for 
legislators and courts to protect children from batterers.12  
Feminists stressed the harmful effects of exposure to domestic 
violence on children, and stated that it is not actually possible to be 
a violent husband and a good father.13 
At the same time, there was a strong trend toward trying to 
keep fathers close to their children.  Father’s rights groups pushed 
for, and succeeded in getting, legislation stressing the importance 
of joint custody.14  Families were no longer seen as “broken,” but 
 
 8. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION (1985); MICHAEL 
WHEELER, NO-FAULT DIVORCE (1974); Erin R. Melnick, Reaffirming No-Fault Divorce: 
Supplementing Formal Equality with Substantive Change, 75 IND. L. J. 711, 714 (2000); 
Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its 
Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987).  See generally, Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal 
of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 291 (1987); Howard Krom, 
California’s Divorce Law Reform: A Historical Analysis, 1 PAC. L. J. 156 (1970).  
 9. Charlotte Germane et al., Mandatory Custody Mediation and Joint Custody 
Orders in California: The Danger for Victims of Domestic Violence, 1  WOMEN’S L.J. 175, 
179 (1985). 
 10. PETER G. JAFFE ET AL., CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN, 20-21 (1990); see 
infra note 35 (citing social science literature about effects of domestic violence on 
children). 
 11. Germane et al., supra note 9. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Nancy K. Lemon, Joint Custody as a Statutory Presumption: California’s New 
Civil Code Sections 4600 and 4600.5, 11 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 485, 505, 510, 516 
(1981); Germane et al., supra note 9, at 181-182. 
4
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instead were “in transition,” with the goal being that both parents 
were still involved in their children’s lives.15  In some cases, courts 
gave fathers more time with their children than they had generally 
spent with them while living with the children’s mother; in these 
cases the goal was not merely to continue the father/child 
relationship, but to try to strengthen it. 
Legislatures started to respond to both these groups.  Some 
states enacted laws stating that domestic violence could be taken 
into account in making custody decisions, but leaving the decision 
up to the judge whether or not to even admit such evidence.16 
Other states went further, actually mandating that judges consider 
domestic violence.17 
A few states passed laws stating that perpetration of domestic 
violence was detrimental to children.18  Others required that judges 
state their reasons for awarding custody to alleged or proven 
batterers on the record19 or make findings of fact that joint custody 
is not detrimental to the children despite the violence, if joint 
custody were granted in a domestic violence case.20 
Meanwhile, many states were also enacting laws allowing for or 
preferring joint custody of children.  Some states created 
presumptions favoring joint custody if the parents agreed to it21 or 
required judges to state their reasons for denying joint custody.22 
In all too many cases, these two trends worked at cross-
purposes.  Given the high rates of domestic violence in the U.S.,23 
especially among divorcing couples,24 there were many cases in 
 
 15. Germane et al., supra note 9, at 181-82. 
 16. See Barbara J. Hart, Custody and Visitation Decision-Making When There are 
Allegations of Domestic Violence, at  http://www.mincava.umn.edu/hart/telecon.htm. 
 17. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.090 (Michie 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3109.04 (West 2000). 
 18. The Family Violence Project of the Nat. Council of Juv. & Fam. Ct. Judges, 
Family Violence in Child Custody Statutes: An Analysis of State Codes and Legal Practice, 
29 FAM. L. Q. 199, 225-227 (1995)[hereinafter Family Violence Project]. 
 19. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994), N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
458:17(II)(c) (1992). 
 20. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(II)(c) (1992); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3109.04 (West 2000). 
 21. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
458:17(II)(c)(1992); see also Lemon, supra note 14, at 500 (discussing the 
legislative history of the first joint custody statute in the U.S.). 
 22. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
458:17(II)(c) (1992). 
 23. Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 6. 
 24. Estimates of the incidence of wife-beating range from at least one in three 
marriages to up to one-half of all marriages.  M. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED 
5
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which courts were presented with one parent arguing for joint 
custody and the other parent arguing that the history of domestic 
violence should preclude such a decision.  Starting in 1991, some 
states resolved this conflict by enacting statutes creating a 
presumption against custody to batterers.25 
III. INCREASING SUPPORT FOR ENACTMENT OF REBUTTABLE 
PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST CUSTODY TO BATTERERS 
A.  Policy Statements 
There were several bases for this new trend.  The first U.S. 
national policy statement supporting a rebuttable presumption in 
domestic violence cases was H. R. Congressional Resolution 172: “It 
is the sense of Congress that, for purposes of determining child 
custody, credible evidence of physical abuse of a spouse should 
create a statutory presumption that it is detrimental to the child to 
be placed in the custody of the abusive spouse.”26  While Congress 
does not have the authority to tell states how to handle custody 
decisions, this Resolution was intended to encourage states to pass 
their own statutes establishing such presumptions. 
In 1994, the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court 
Judges released the Model Code on Domestic and Family 
Violence.27  This Code was developed in conjunction with 
legislators, the American Bar Association, the American Medical 
Association, domestic violence experts, prosecutors, and defense 
counsel over a period of three years.28  Section 401 of the Model 
Code states:  
In every proceeding where there is at issue a dispute as to 
 
DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 31 (1980); Eisenberg & Micklow, The 
Assaulted Wife: ‘Catch 22’ Revisited, 3 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 138 (1977); Laurie 
Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 39, 41 (1981). 
See also HOFF ET AL., INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES AND PARENTAL 
KIDNAPPING: POLICY, PRACTICE AND LAW 3-15 (1982) (scope of wife battering and 
the extent of underreporting). 
 25. Family Violence Project, supra note 18, at 208. 
 26. H.R.J. Res. 172, 101st Cong. (1994) (sponsored by Rep. Constance 
Morella and passed unanimously on Oct. 25, 1990). 
 27. NAT. COUNCIL OF JUV. AND FAM. CT. JUDGES, MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC 
AND FAMILY VIOLENCE (1994),[hereinafter MODEL CODE]. 
 28. Christine L. Bailey & Maureen Sheeran, The Model Code on Domestic and 
Family Violence: A Call for Legislative Action and Community Response, NEV. PUB. AFF. 
REV. 24 (Legis. Issues: 1995). 
6
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the custody of a child, a determination by the court that 
domestic or family violence has occurred raises a 
rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to the child 
and not in the best interest of the child to be placed in 
sole custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody 
with the perpetrator of family violence.29 
The American Bar Association (ABA) passed a resolution in 
August 1989 that joint custody is inappropriate in cases in which 
spouse abuse, child abuse, or parental kidnapping is likely to 
occur.30  In 1994, the ABA published a report to its president 
suggesting the adoption of statutes creating a presumption against 
custody to batterers.31  In July 2000 the ABA adopted new policy 
statements with respect to domestic violence and custody, and 
recommended that states and lawyers take action to provide for the 
safety of adult and child domestic violence victims during visitation 
and visitation exchanges.32 
In 1996, the American Psychological Association also 
recommended that states adopt such statutes:  
In matters of custody, preference should be given to the 
nonviolent parent whenever possible, and unsupervised 
visitation should not be granted to the perpetrator until 
an offender-specific treatment program is successfully 
completed, or the offender proves that he is no longer a 
threat to the physical and emotional safety of the child 
and the other parent.33 
Similarly, the Uniform Adoption Act provides for terminating 
a father’s rights if “the respondent has been convicted of a crime of 
violence or of violating a restraining or protective order, and the 
facts of the crime or violation and the respondent’s behavior 
indicate that the respondent is unfit to maintain a relationship of 
 
 29. MODEL CODE, supra note 28, § 410, at 33. 
 30. A.B.A. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, APPROVED RESOLUTIONS RELATED TO 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1989); see also A.B.A. Model Joint Custody Statute, 15 FAM. L. 
REV. 1494, 1495 (1989)(requiring courts to consider domestic violence in making 
joint custody awards). 
 31. Howard Davidson, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON CHILDREN: A 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE A.B.A. (1994). 
 32. Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: 
Redefining Families, Reforming Custody Jurisdiction, and Refining Support Issues, 34 FAM. 
L.Q. 607, 626 (Winter, 2001). For content of new A.B.A. policies, see 
http://www.abanet.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2001). 
 33. A.B.A., VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY, 99 (1996). 
7
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parent and child with the minor . . . .”34 
1.  Social Science Literature 
Another reason statutes establishing a presumption against 
custody to batterers were enacted was the growing body of social 
science literature showing the often severe and long-lasting effects 
of domestic violence on children.35  This literature also argued that 
joint custody was contraindicated when there has been family 
violence.36 
2.  Mothers Losing Custody 
Furthermore, studies and articles started to show that when 
fathers in general or batterers in particular fought for custody, they 
usually won.37  There are also many cases in which mothers initially 
 
 34. UNIFORM ADOPTION ACT § 3-504 (1994).     
 35. ENDING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO CHILDREN OF 
BATTERED WOMEN (E. Peled et al., eds., 1995); P.G. JAFFE ET AL., CHILDREN OF 
BATTERED WOMEN (1990); D.A. Wolfe et al., Children of Battered Women: The Relation 
of Child Behavior to Family Violence and Maternal Stress, 53 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 657 (1985); N.Z. Hilton, Battered Women’s Concerns About their Children 
Witnessing Wife Assault, 7 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 77 (1992); J.R. Johnston & 
L.E.G. Campbell, Parent-child Relationships in Domestic Violence Families Disputing 
Custody, 31 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 282, 282-83 (1993); M. Roy, Children in 
the Crossfire, HEALTH COMM. (1988); P.G. Jaffe et al., Child Witnesses of Woman Abuse: 
How Can Schools Respond?, 14 RESPONSE TO VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN 
12 (1992); D. G. Saunders, Child Custody Decisions in Families Experiencing Wife Abuse, 
39 SOC. WORK 51 (1994).  
 36. L. Crites & D. Coker, What Therapists See That Judges May Miss: A Unique 
Guide to Custody Decisions When Spouse Abuse is Charged, JUDGES J. 9-13 (Spring, 
1988); Germane et al., supra note 9; M. D. Pagelow, Justice for Victims of Spouse Abuse 
in Divorce and Child Custody Cases, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 69 (1993); Pauline 
Quirion, Increased Protection for Children from Violent Homes: The Presumption Against 
Awarding Child Custody to a Batterer, 16 MASS. FAM. L. J. 67 (1998); Saunders, supra 
note 35, at 56 (citing R. E. Emery and M. M. Wyer, Divorce Mediation, 42 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 472 (1987)).  
 37. Pagelow, supra note 36 (citing R. Geffner & M. Pagelow, Victims of Spouse 
Abuse, in TREATMENT OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 81-97 (R. T. Ammerman 
& M. Hersen, eds.) (1990)); L. A. Marks, Mandatory Mediation of Family Law and 
Domestic Violence Cases, NCADV VOICE, 18-22 (Winter, 1988); M. B. Liss & G. B. 
Stahly, Domestic Violence and Child Custody, in BATTERING AND FAMILY THERAPY: A 
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 175 (M. Hansen & M. Harway, eds., 1993); J. Zorza, Protecting 
the Children: Custody Disputes When One Parent Abuses the Other, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE 
REV. 1113 (April 1996) (citing R. I. ABRAMS AND J. M. GREANEY, REPORT OF THE 
GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT [OF MASSACHUSETTS] 62-63 
(1989) that stated fathers won in seventy percent of contested custody cases and 
noting that this report also cites similar findings from California and the entire 
nation); M. A. Mason & A. Quirk, Are Mothers Losing Custody? Read My Lips: Trends 
8
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or eventually lost custody due to their inability to get along with the 
fathers.  In some of these, in which there were no allegations of 
partner abuse, the court first awarded joint custody, then found 
after awhile that this was unworkable due to continued conflict 
between the parents.38 
In other cases, there was extensive evidence of partner abuse.  
The fact that a formerly battered mother and her former batterer 
are not able to co-parent effectively is not at all surprising.  
However, it is very unfortunate that many courts are still so 
unaware of how domestic violence dynamics enter into custody 
cases.  One wonders why the court ever expected people in this 
situation to suddenly be able to cooperate. 
An example of such a case is found in In re Marriage of 
Devilbiss.39  In that case, the evidence included fifteen police 
reports, testimony by the daughter that the father used to hit the 
mother, and allegations that he also choked the daughter.40  
However, the court ignored this evidence in its order changing the 
joint custody order to “rotating custody.”41  Under this 
arrangement, the daughter was ordered to live with her mother for 
seven months each year and with her father for five months.42  The 
court noted that the parents had not been able to cooperate as 
required by the joint custody order.43  Another example is found in 
 
in Judicial Decision-Making in Custody Disputes—1920, 1960, 1990, and 1995, 31 FAM. 
L. Q. 215 (1997) (citing a study finding that fathers won in sixty-three percent of 
contested custody cases, Lisa Genasci, Increasingly, Working Mothers Lose in Custody 
Fights, L.A. TIMES, January 20, 1995, at D8); Mary Lynne Vellinga, Custody Laws 
Under Fire: Parents Who Batter Often Allowed to Retain Joint Care, SACRAMENTO BEE, 
March 23, 1997, at A1. 
 38. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cobb, 988 P.2d 272, 273 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) 
(court briefly mentions without comment allegations that father abused child, 
then changed joint custody award to sole custody to father due to parents’ inability 
to co-parent); Brown v. Brown, 19 S.W.3d 717, 722-23 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000)(without 
any allegations of abuse, the court modified the joint custody arrangement to sole 
custody to the father because of the mother’s unwillingness to co-parent and that 
the father is best suited to make decisions in the best interests of the child); 
Thomas v. Thomas, 991 P.2d 7, 10 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (noting no allegations of 
abuse, the court changed joint custody to sole to father due to parents’ inability to 
co-parent). 
 39. 719 N.E.2d 375 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
 40. Id. at 378-80. 
 41. Id. at 383. 
 42. Id. at 380 (affirming the trial court’s ruling that the daughter live with the 
father from the first Saturday after the end of the school year to the first Saturday 
of November). 
 43. Id. at 385. 
9
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Canty v. Canty,44 in which the trial court modified the joint legal 
and split physical custody award to sole physical custody with the 
father, in spite of his admitting that he had committed domestic 
violence on the mother.45  The appellate court upheld this order, 
noting that the evidence of domestic violence was merely one 
factor in the best interests analysis.46 
In all too many cases, batterers are in effect using the family 
courts to re-victimize their victims.47  Instead of preventing this, 
courts sometimes collude with this behavior by awarding the 
batterer joint custody, sole custody, or extensive unsupervised 
visitation.  While examining appellate cases decided in states 
without such a presumption or before the enactment of the 
presumption is beyond the scope of this article, it is noteworthy 
that in many such cases judges clearly ignored extensive histories of 
domestic violence in making custody decisions.48 
IV. DESCRIPTION OF STATUTES ESTABLISHING PRESUMPTIONS 
AGAINST CUSTODY TO BATTERERS 
A.  Overview 
In response to the growing body of policy statements, studies, 
articles and cases, states started to adopt statutes establishing a 
rebuttable presumption against custody to batterers.49  As of 
January 2001, there were sixteen states plus the District of 
 
 44. 874 P.2d 1000 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). 
 45. Id. at 1005. 
 46. Arizona later amended its custody statute to provide that domestic 
violence created a presumption against custody to the batterer. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 
25-403 (2000). 
 47. This problem is described at length in Leigh Goodmark, From Property to 
Personhood: What the Legal System Should do for Children in Family Violence Cases, 102 
W. VA. L. REV. 237 (1999). See also, Quirion, supra note 36, at 67. 
 48. See cases described in Goodmark, supra note 47, at 254-75.  See also, 
NANCY K. D. LEMON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & CHILDREN: RESOLVING CUSTODY AND 
VISITATION DISPUTES, FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, 39-40 (1995).  But see 
Bruscato v. Bruscato, 593 So. 2d 838 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (remanding case for 
more thorough evaluation and retrial where batterer father was awarded sole 
custody even though rebuttable presumption was not yet in effect). 
 49. For an argument in favor of the adoption of such a presumption in 
Massachusetts, see Pauline Quirion et al., Commentary: Protecting Children Exposed To 
Domestic Violence In Contested Custody And Visitation Litigation, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
501 (1997).  A similar argument in New York is found in Kurtz, supra note 6, at 
1346. 
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Columbia which had adopted such statutes.50  In the summer of 
 
 50. These included Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, District of 
Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota.  In Alabama, there 
exists a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental to child and not in best 
interest of child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical 
custody when court determines that domestic violence has occurred.  ALA. CODE § 
30-3-131 (1975).  In addition, the state has a rebuttable presumption that it is in 
the best interest of the child to reside with the parent who is not a perpetrator of 
domestic or family violence.  ALA. CODE § 30-3-133 (1975).  The state of Arizona 
makes it a rebuttable presumption that an award of custody to the parent who 
committed the act of domestic violence is contrary to the child’s best interests, if 
the court determines that a parent has committed an act of domestic violence 
against the other parent; however, such presumption does not apply if both 
parents have committed an act of domestic violence.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403 
(2000).  California provides that a rebuttable presumption exists against sole or 
joint physical or legal custody if the court finds that a party perpetrated domestic 
violence.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West Supp. 2001).  The statute allows that this 
presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id.  The 
statute identifies factors to overcome the presumption.  Id.  In Delaware, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that no perpetrator of domestic violence shall be awarded 
sole or joint custody and a rebuttable presumption that no child shall primarily 
reside with perpetrator of domestic violence.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 705A 
(1999).  This presumption is overcome by a preponderance of the evidence.  Id.  
The statute identifies factors needed to overcome presumption.  Id.  Otherwise the 
presumption may be overcome only if a judicial officer finds extraordinary 
circumstances that warrant the rejection of the presumption.  Id.  The state of 
Florida has a rebuttable presumption of detriment to the child and against 
ordering shared parental responsibility, including visitation, residence of the 
child, and decisions made regarding the child, if there is evidence that a parent 
has been convicted of a felony of the third degree or higher involving domestic 
violence.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West 1997).  Hawaii’s rebuttable presumption 
statute provides that it is detrimental to the child and not in the best interest of 
the child to be placed in sole custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody 
if the court determines that family violence has been committed by a parent.  
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46 (Michie 1999).  In Iowa, rebuttable presumption 
exists against joint custody if the court finds a history of domestic abuse.  IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 598-41 (West Supp. 2001).  This finding, if not rebutted, outweighs 
any other factor in determining the award of custody.  Id.  Louisiana has a 
presumption against sole or joint custody if a parent has a history of perpetrating 
family violence.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364 (West 2000).  The court must find 
that that one incident of family violence resulted in serious bodily injury or more 
than one incident of family violence occurred before such a presumption can be 
applied.  Id.  Such a presumption may be overcome by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Id.  This statute also identifies factors to overcome the presumption.  Id.  
Massachusetts has a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the best interests of 
the child to be placed in sole custody, shared legal custody, or shared physical 
custody with the abusive parent if court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that a pattern or serious incident of abuse has occurred, which may be overcome 
by a preponderance of the evidence that such custody award is in the best interests 
of the child.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. chs. 208 § 31A, 209 § 38, 209C § 10 (West 
Supp. 2001).  In Nevada, the statute provides that a rebuttable presumption that 
11
Lemon: Statutes Creating Rebuttable Presumptions against Custody to Batt
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
04_FORMAT.LEMON.10.12.01.DOC 11/1/2001  5:58 PM 
612 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:2 
2001, Texas passed legislation strengthening its statute, creating a 
rebuttable presumption against joint custody, sole custody, or 
unsupervised visitation in cases of child abuse, child neglect, or 
 
sole or joint custody with the perpetrator of domestic violence is not in the best 
interests of the child if court determines after an evidentiary hearing and finding 
by clear and convincing evidence that either parent or any other person seeking 
custody has engaged in one or more acts of domestic violence.  NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 125.480 (Michie Supp. 1999).  The state also provides that there exists a 
rebuttable presumption that sole or joint custody of the child by the perpetrator of 
sexual assault is not in the best interest of the child if the person is convicted of 
sexual assault and the parties later divorce.  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §125C.210 
(Michie Supp. 1999).  In addition, there exists a rebuttable presumption that sole 
or joint custody by the parent convicted of first degree murder of the other parent 
is not in the best interest of the child and also includes a rebuttable presumption 
that rights to visitation with the child by the parent convicted of first degree 
murder of the other parent are not in the best interest of the child and must not 
be granted if custody is not granted.  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.220 (Michie 
Supp. 1999).  There is a rebuttable presumption that sole or joint custody by the 
perpetrator of domestic violence is not in the best interest of the child, if after an 
evidentiary hearing the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that either 
parent or any other person seeking custody has engaged in one or more acts of 
domestic violence against the child, a parent, or any other person residing with 
the child.  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125C.230 (Michie Supp. 1999).  Nevada also 
provides a rebuttable presumption that custody with the perpetrator of domestic 
violence is not in the best interests of the child if court determines after an 
evidentiary hearing and finding by clear and convincing evidence that either 
parent or any other person seeking custody has engaged in one or more acts of 
domestic violence.  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432B.157 (Michie 2000).  In North 
Dakota, there is a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has perpetrated 
domestic violence may not be awarded sole or joint custody if the court finds 
credible evidence that domestic violence has occurred and there exists one 
incident of domestic violence which resulted in serious bodily injury or involved 
the use of a dangerous weapon or there exists a pattern of domestic violence 
within a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-
06.2 (1999).  This presumption may be overcome only by clear and convincing 
evidence that the best interests of the child require that parent’s participation as a 
custodial parent.  Id.  Oklahoma’s rebuttable presumption statute provides that it 
is not in the best interests of the child to have custody, guardianship or 
unsupervised visitation granted to the abusive person if the occurrence of ongoing 
domestic abuse is established by clear and convincing evidence.  OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 43 § 112.2, tit. 10 § 21.1 (West 2001).  In Oregon, there exists a rebuttable 
presumption that it is not in the best interests and welfare of the child to award 
sole or joint custody to the parent who committed abuse.  OR. REV. STAT. § 
107.137 (1989).  In South Dakota, there is a rebuttable presumption that awarding 
custody to the abusive parent is not in the best interests of the minor if the person 
has been convicted of domestic abuse or assault against a person, other than a 
person related by consanguinity, but not living in the same household.  S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45.5 (Michie 1999).  In addition, there is a rebuttable 
presumption that awarding custody or granting visitation to the parent convicted 
for the death of the other parent, excluding vehicular homicide, is not in the best 
interests of the minor.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45.6 (Michie 1999). 
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partner abuse, including sexual abuse resulting in the birth of the 
child.51  Additionally, at this point, three states have adopted 
presumptions against joint custody in domestic violence cases or 
considered the perpetration of domestic violence stronger than a 
factor, but do not actually state a presumption against awarding 
custody to the abusive parent.52 
These twenty states plus the District of Columbia are a 
subgroup of the forty-eight jurisdictions that had adopted some 
type of legislation regarding domestic violence as a custody factor 
by the beginning of 2001.53  The only states without any statute 
discussing this issue as of that date were Connecticut, Mississippi, 
and Utah.54 
The presumption statutes vary greatly, in terms of 1) whether 
the presumption applies to all types of custody or only to joint 
custody; 2) how domestic violence is defined, that is what type of 
evidence is required to trigger the presumption; 3) what 
evidentiary standard is required to trigger the presumption; 4) 
what type of evidence is required to rebut the presumption; and 5) 
what evidentiary standard is required to rebut the presumption.  
They also vary in terms of what the court is to do if both parents 
appear to have been abusive, and what standard should be applied 
if the presumption is found inapplicable. 
 
 51. See Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 586 (Vernon) (amending TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 
153.004 (Vernon 1996)). See also Steve McGonigle, Girls’ Slayings Inspire Bill: 
Unsupervised Visits Would Require Judge’s Approval, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 
26, 2001, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/metro/stories/ 
377451_battaglia26me.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2001). 
 52. These included Colorado, Washington, and Wisconsin.  In Colorado, if 
the court makes a finding of fact that domestic violence has occurred, then it shall 
not be in the bests interest of the child to allocate mutual decision-making 
responsibility over the objection of the other party or the child’s representative, 
unless the court finds that the parties can make shared decisions about their 
children without physical confrontation and that places the abused party or child 
in danger.  See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124 (1.5)(b)(v) (West 1997).  In the 
state of Washington, a parent’s residential time with child will be limited if there 
exists a history of acts of domestic violence or assault/sexual assault “which causes 
grievous bodily harm or fear of such harm.”  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
26.09.191(2)(a)(ii)-(iii) (West 1997).  In Wisconsin, a rebuttable presumption 
exists that the parents will not be able to cooperate in future decision-making 
when domestic violence is present.  See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2)(b)-(c) (West 
1993).  Pennsylvania also gives great weight to the perpetration of domestic 
violence or sexual assault by requiring successful completion of a batterer’s 
treatment program if the abuser is convicted of certain crimes.  See 23 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 5303 (West 1991). 
 53. Elrod & Spector, supra note 32, at 613-14. 
 54. Id. 
13
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B.  Presumption Applicable Only to Joint Custody 
Some presumption statutes apply only to decisions regarding 
joint custody.  In a few of these states, the presumption against joint 
custody to the abuser is coupled with a presumption favoring joint 
custody in the absence of abuse.55  The District of Columbia Code 
provides that there is a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is 
not in the best interest of the child if the court finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that an intra-family offense has 
occurred.56  It also provides for a rebuttable presumption favoring 
joint custody unless the court finds by a preponderance of the 
evidence that an intra-family offense has occurred.57  Similarly, 
section 32-717B of the Idaho Code states that there is a 
presumption that joint custody is not in the best interests of a 
minor child if the court finds that one of the parents is a habitual 
perpetrator of domestic violence.58  It also contains a presumption 
that joint custody is in the best interest of the child absent a 
preponderance of the evidence to the contrary.59  This type of 
provision is not very beneficial for victims of domestic violence, 
since even if the presumption against joint custody is rebutted 
through evidence of abuse, the victimized parent must still prove to 
the court that it is in the best interests of the child to be placed with 
him or her rather than with the abusive parent. 
A particularly problematic statute is found in Minnesota, which 
contains a similar provision, but applicable only to joint legal 
custody.60  Minnesota Statute section 518.17 includes a rebuttable 
presumption that joint legal custody is not in the best interests of 
the child if domestic abuse has occurred between the parents.61  
However, the same code section states that there is also a rebuttable 
presumption that joint legal custody, if requested by either or both 
parties, is in the best interests of the child.62  Clearly there will be 
many cases in which these two policies conflict, especially when the 
abusive parent can trigger the presumption favoring joint legal 
 
 55. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-119(a)(5), 16-914(a)(2) (1997); IDAHO 
CODE § 32-717 B (Michie 1996). 
 56. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-119(a)(5), 16-914(a)(2) (1997). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See IDAHO CODE § 32-717 B (5) (Michie 1996). 
 59. See id. § 32-717 B (4). 
 60. See  MINN. STAT. § 518.17, subd. 2(d) (2000). 
 61. Id.  The statute does not state what evidence rebuts the presumption.  Id. 
 62. Id.  New Hampshire law provides a similar provision.  See N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 458:17(II)(e)(1992) (amended by 2001 N.H. Laws 102). 
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custody merely by requesting it.  Case law demonstrating how 
courts have resolved this dilemma will be discussed below.  On the 
other hand, the Minnesota statute does state that if the court 
awards joint custody, it must make detailed findings of fact on each 
of the best interest standards.63 
C.  Presumption Applicable to Sole or Joint Custody 
Most of the presumption states have no contrary presumption 
favoring joint custody in the absence of domestic violence or when 
requested by a parent.  Statutes stating that the presumption 
applies to sole or joint custody to a perpetrator are in effect in 
Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Oregon, Texas, and South Dakota.64 
D.  What Triggers the Presumption? 
Statutes vary in terms in how they define domestic violence 
and what standard of proof is required in order to trigger the 
presumption against awarding custody to an abuser.  Several states 
define domestic violence by cross-referencing other statutes, such 
as a state’s restraining order statute.65  It is important to take note 
whether these statutes include threats of physical harm, or only 
actual physical harm.  Also note that the statutes tend to leave out 
other types of batterer behavior which are intended to dominate 
and control victims, such as emotional abuse, sexual abuse, 
financial abuse, and property abuse, all of which may be intended 
to dominate and control the victim.66 
In terms of standards of proof, in some states, the statute 
merely provides that there must be a “finding of domestic 
violence,”67 or “credible evidence of domestic violence.”68  A few 
statutes specify that the standard will be the lowest possible, the 
 
 63. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2000). 
 64. For citations to the rebuttable presumption statutes, see supra note 51. 
 65. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West Supp. 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 
§ 705A (1999); MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (West 
1993). 
 66. Amy Pincolini, A Tool for Safety: Child Custody Presumptions, 5 SYNERGY 6, 7 
(2000) (published by Nat. Council of Juv. & Fam. Ct. Judges, Reno, NV). 
 67. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. § 518.17 
(2000). 
 68. See, e.g., N. D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (1)(j) (West Supp. 2001). 
15
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preponderance of the evidence.69  Other states require the 
standard of “clear and convincing evidence” of domestic violence.70  
Wisconsin requires evidence of a crime of inter-spousal battery or 
abuse, as defined in the statute providing for civil protective 
orders.71  However, actual conviction is not required in this state 
before the presumption is triggered. 
Some states require that the domestic violence have occurred 
more than once.  For example, Idaho requires that the abuser be a 
“habitual perpetrator” before the presumption is triggered.72  Iowa 
requires “a history of domestic abuse,”73 and Oklahoma requires 
“ongoing domestic abuse.”74  In several states, there must be either 
a pattern or history of abuse, or at least one serious incident before 
the presumption is triggered.  These include Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, and North Dakota.75 
The highest standards of proof are found in states requiring 
that the abuser first be convicted of a domestic violence crime.76  As 
stated above, Nevada’s presumption can be triggered by clear and 
convincing evidence of domestic violence; alternatively, it can be 
triggered by a conviction of sexual assault or first-degree murder of 
the other parent.77 
Setting the standard for triggering the presumption high will 
 
 69. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West Supp. 2001); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-
911, 16-914 (1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. chs. 208, § 31A, 209, § 38, 209C § 10 
(West Supp. 2001). 
 70. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(5) (1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112.2 
(West 2001); 2001 Okla. Sess. Laws 141 (amending OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 21.1 
(2000)). 
 71. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.24, 813.12 (West 1993). 
 72. IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(5) (Michie 2000). 
 73. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598-41 (West Supp. 2001). 
 74. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112.2 (West 2001); 2001 Okla. Sess. Laws 141. 
 75. Louisiana requires more than one incident or a finding that one incident 
of family violence resulted in serious bodily injury.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A) 
(West 2000). Massachusetts requires either a pattern or serious incident of abuse.  
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. chs. 208, § 31A, 209, § 38, 209C § 10 (West Supp. 2001).  
North Dakota requires either one incident resulting in serious bodily injury or 
involving the use of a dangerous weapon, or a pattern of domestic violence within 
a reasonable time proximate to the proceeding.  N. D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-
06.2(i)(j) (1999). 
 76. Florida requires a conviction for a third degree felony or higher involving 
domestic violence.  2001 Fla. Laws ch. 2001-2 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 
(West 1997)).  South Dakota requires a conviction of domestic abuse or assault, or 
homicide of the other parent.  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-4-45.5, 25-4-45.6 (Michie 
1999). 
 77. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 125.480, 125C.210, 125C.220, 125C.230 (Michie 
Supp. 1999). 
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of course exclude many domestic violence cases, in which there has 
been only one incident of abuse, and no conviction. In many 
relationships, one incident of abuse can be sufficient to dominate 
and control the victim throughout the relationship.  This can occur 
when the batterer uses the incident to warn and remind the victim 
of what can happen.78  Of course, children who are aware of the 
abuse by one parent toward the other can also be traumatized by 
one incident.79 
However, in some cases the high standards enumerated here 
were narrowly drafted to account for the possibility that some 
abused parents might use violence in self-defense or to protect 
children, in which case the presumption was not designed to 
apply.80  As will be seen in the discussion in Part IV, in states with 
lower standards for triggering the presumption, such actions by the 
abused parent may be seen as nullifying the presumption.  In 
drafting the language of such statutes, legislators and advocates 
must always engage in balancing tests, weighing the benefits of a 
lower standard for triggering the presumption against the danger 
to victims who fight back. 
E.  Cases In Which Both Parents Have Engaged in Domestic Violence 
Some of the presumption statutes address situations in which 
both parents appear to have engaged in abuse.  In at least one 
state, Louisiana, the statute contains a “primary aggressor”81 
provision.  This directs the court to determine which of the parents 
is the main or dominant aggressor, and to ascertain whether one of 
the parents was actually acting to defend herself or himself or 
another person, such as the child.82  The North Dakota Supreme 
Court has developed such a concept through its decisions 
interpreting the presumption.83  In other states, the statute provides 
 
 78. DONALD G. DUTTON AND SUSAN K. GOLANT, THE BATTERER: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE 13, 23, 24 (1995). 
 79. Janis Wolak & David Finkelhor, Children Exposed to Partner Violence in 
PARTNER VIOLENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF TWENTY YEARS OF RESEARCH 90 
(Janis L. Jasinski & Linda M. Williams eds., 1998). 
 80. The Family Violence Project, supra note 18, at 206. 
 81. This term was changed to “dominant aggressor” in CAL. PENAL CODE § 
836, effective January 2001.  The legislative history indicates that this change was 
made in order to clarify that the focus should be on which party dominates the 
other, rather than on who “started the fight.” 
 82. See, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:362(3) (West 2000). 
 83. See, e.g., Krank v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844, 848 (N.D. 1995). 
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that if both parents are found to have committed domestic 
violence, the presumption against the abuser does not apply.84 
Given the likelihood that both parents will be found to be 
abusers in states with low standards for triggering the presumption, 
it would probably be advisable to amend these statutes to provide 
for a primary or dominant aggressor analysis.  This is similar to the 
analysis which law enforcement uses in some states when 
determining which party to arrest.85 
F.  Rebutting the Presumption 
The statutes also vary in terms of what is necessary in order to 
rebut the presumption.  Most states do not specify what is required 
for rebuttal, which does not give courts any guidance.  A few states 
specify the evidentiary standard required, but do not list actual 
factors for consideration, which also leaves the court having to 
create its own standards from case to case.86 
Other states list specific factors that the court must consider in 
finding that the presumption has been rebutted.87  For example, 
California states that the court must consider 1) whether the 
perpetrator has shown that it is in the best interest of the child to 
be in the custody of that parent; 2) successful completion of a 
batterer’s program; 3) successful completion of a program for 
alcohol or drug abuse if found appropriate by the court; 4) 
compliance with court orders and with probation and parole 
conditions, if applicable; and 5) whether there has been any 
further violence.88  The Arizona89 and Delaware factors are virtually 
identical to this.90  Louisiana requires the successful completion of 
a treatment program for batterers, refraining from abuse of alcohol 
 
 84. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(N) (2000) (amended by 2001 Ariz. 
Sess. Laws 14); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(c) (West Supp. 2001). 
 85. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West Supp. 2001). However, see the 
discussion in Part IV regarding the controversy surrounding whether to include 
such a provision. 
 86. For example, in Massachusetts the court must find by preponderance of 
evidence that custody to abuser is in best interests of child.  MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
chs. 208 § 31A, 209 § 38, 209C § 10 (1998).  In North Dakota, the presumption 
may be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence that the best interests of 
the child require that parent’s participation as custodial parent.  N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 14-09-06.2(1)(j)(1999). 
 87. These states include: Arizona, California, Delaware, and Louisiana. 
 88. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(b) (West Supp. 2001). 
 89. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-403 (2000) (amended by 2001 Ariz. Sess. Laws 14). 
 90. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 705A (1999). 
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or illegal drugs, and demonstrating that the absence or incapacity 
of the abused parent or other circumstances are such that custody 
granted to the perpetrator is in the best interests of the child.91  Its 
statute also directs the court to give sole custody to the parent who 
is least likely to continue perpetration of family violence.92 
As noted previously, Wisconsin has a presumption only against 
joint legal custody in domestic violence cases.93  In order to rebut 
this, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the 
perpetrator will not interfere with the abused party’s ability to 
cooperate in future decision-making.94 
G.  If the Presumption is Found Inapplicable or Rebutted 
If the presumption is found inapplicable or rebutted, then the 
parties may still have the benefit of statutes requiring that domestic 
violence be considered in custody decisions.95  Legislatures are 
strongly encouraged to enact such statutes, so that the issue of 
domestic violence does not disappear from the custody decision.  
In the absence of such statutes, the court applies the general best 
interest of the child standard and the parties are on a level playing 
field.  This may be very problematic for the battered parent, who 
then still has to convince the court that the child has been 
adversely affected by the abuse, or that there is ongoing danger to 
the victim parent or child. 
H.  Case Study: Development of the Presumption in California 
While California was not the first state to adopt a rebuttable 
presumption statute, the history of its legislation is a useful 
example of a “step by step” approach.  Like many other states, 
California attempted several different versions of its custody 
statutes before passing a statute establishing a presumption against 
custody to batterers. 
California was the fifteenth state to adopt such a presumption 
statute, which took effect January 2000.96  This legislation, A.B. 
 
 91. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A) (West 2000). 
 92. Id. § 9:364(B). 
 93. See supra note 52. 
 94. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24 (West 1993). 
 95. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West Supp. 2001). 
 96. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West 2000) (added by Stats. 1999, c. 445 (A.B. 
840), §1). 
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840,97 was carried by Speaker Pro Tem Sheila Kuehl, a long-time 
advocate for victims of domestic violence.98  The California Alliance 
Against Domestic Violence (C.A.A.D.V.) sponsored the bill.99  
Supporters included medical groups, law enforcement, 
prosecutors, Boards of Supervisors, many women’s groups, the 
California State PTA, and numerous domestic violence 
organizations.100  Opposition included the California Judges 
Association, the Judicial Council, the Family Law Section of the 
State Bar, and the Coalition of Parent Support, a father’s rights 
group.101  This legislation was based on the Model Code.102  Kuehl 
had been a member of the national task force which wrote that 
Code. 
A.B. 840 was preceded by two bills, both of which were carried 
by Assemblywoman Kuehl.  A.B. 800, introduced in 1996, died in 
the Senate Judiciary Committee, and A.B. 200, introduced in 1997, 
was amended in that same committee to remove the rebuttable 
presumption language.  A.B. 200, amending Family Code sections 
3011 and 3020, was effective January 1998.103  Among other 
provisions, these sections now mandate that judges prioritize the 
child’s health, safety, and welfare over the policy favoring frequent 
and continuing contact with each parent after separation.104  They 
also require judges to make written findings of fact or statements 
on the record as to why they are awarding custody to an alleged 
perpetrator of domestic violence or child abuse, or to an alleged 
substance abuser.105 
 
 97. A.B. 840/ Assembly Bill 840, 1999 Legs. (Cal. 1999). 
 98. Syrus Devers, AB 840 Assembly Bill, Bill Analysis 3, at 
http:www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/9900/bill/asm/ab_08010850/ab_840_cfa_19990422
_080416_asm_comm.html (April 20, 1999).  See also, http://democrats.sen.ca.gov/ 
senator/kuehl (describing Senator Kuehl’s achievements).  Assemblywoman 
Sheila Kuehl is serving her first term in the California Senate after serving six years 
in the State Assembly.  Id.  She was formerly the Speaker Pro Tempore of the 
Assembly (from 1997-98).  Id.  Kuehl is also a former Professor of Law at Loyola, 
U.C.L.A. and U.S.C. Schools of Law and co-founder of the California Women’s 
Law Center.  Id. 
 99. Devers, supra note 98, at 3. 
 100. Id. at 8-9. 
 101. See id. at 9. 
 102. See id. at 3.  See also, supra note 27 and accompanying text (describing the 
ABA’s Model Code). 
 103. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (amended by stats. 1997, c.899 (A.B. 200), §2); 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (amended by Stats. 1997, c. 849 (A.B. 200), § 3). 
 104. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020(c) (West Supp. 2001). 
 105. Id.  See also, Marlene Rapkin, The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody 
Decisions, 19 J. JUV. L. 404 (1998) (describing the legislative history of A.B. 200 and 
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A.B. 840 created a new code section, Family Code section 
3044.106  Subdivision (a) describes how a victim of domestic 
violence raises the presumption.107  There are several limitations.  
First, the incident must have occurred within the last five years.108  
Second, the presumption is triggered only by incidents in which 
the victim was the other person seeking custody of the child, the 
child, or the child’s siblings.109  Third, the court must make a 
finding that domestic violence occurred, so that allegations alone 
do not trigger the presumption.110  If the court makes such a 
finding, the burden of proof then shifts to the perpetrator to prove 
why it is in the best interests of the child to be in his or her 
custody.111  All types of custody are specifically included, whether 
legal or physical, sole or joint.112  However, the new code section 
does not address visitation.113 
Subdivision (b) of Family Code section 3044 describes how the 
perpetrator can rebut the presumption, clarifying that the standard 
of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, and listing several 
factors that the court is directed to consider in making this 
determination.114 According to subdivision (c) the presumption 
does not apply if both parents are found to have perpetrated 
domestic violence.115  This subdivision had originally provided for a 
“primary aggressor” analysis, cross-referencing the California Penal 
 
arguing that it did not go far enough, that is that California needed to enact a 
presumption against custody to batterers). 
 106. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044 (West Supp. 2001).  A particularly useful 
document in terms of legislative history of this code section was written by Syrus 
Devers, legislative counsel for the California Assembly Judiciary Committee, when 
the bill was heard in that committee April 22, 1999. See Devers, supra note 98. 
 107. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(a) (West Supp. 2001)(stating “[u]pon a finding 
by the court that a party seeking custody of a child has perpetrated domestic 
violence against the other party seeking custody of the child or against the child or 
the child’s sibling within the previous five years, there is a rebuttable presumption 
that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to the person who 
has perpetrated the domestic violence is detrimental the best interest of the 
child.”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(b)(1) (West Supp. 2001). 
 112. Id. § 3044(a). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. § 3044(b)(1)-(6). 
 115. Id. § 3044(e) (stating that “[i]n most cases in which both parents are 
perpetrators of domestic violence, this presumption shall not be applicable.”). 
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Code’s definition of that term,116 but was amended in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee to delete that provision.  Subdivision (d) 
defines domestic violence, using the same standard as is used in 
Family Code section 6320 for obtaining a Domestic Violence 
Restraining Order.117 
I.  Effects of Presumption Statutes 
1.  Overview 
How are these statutes working?  Are they accomplishing the 
objectives of the legislators who authored them and the groups who 
supported them?  Is implementation uniform or uneven?  Do 
presumptions against custody to batterers mean that family courts 
now are giving domestic violence the weight it deserves?  Is there a 
backlash in some jurisdictions, and if so, what does it look like?  In 
attempting to answer these questions, this section will look at 
appellate cases,118 articles by commentators, surveys, and anecdotal 
comments from advocates, attorneys, judges, and academics in the 
presumption jurisdictions. 
Appellate cases from the jurisdictions with such a presumption 
indicate that in general it appears to be useful.119  However, there 
 
 116. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 863 (e)(3) (West 2001) (defining the term 
“primary aggressor”).  Section 836 also states the factors that a police officer 
should consider in identifying the primary aggressor, including “the intent of the 
law to protect victims of domestic violence from continuing abuse” and “the 
history of domestic violence between the persons involved.”  Id. 
 117. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044(d) (West Supp. 2001) (stating that a person has 
“perpetrated domestic violence” for the purposes of section 3044 “when he or she 
is found by the court to have intentionally or recklessly caused or attempted to 
cause bodily injury, or sexual assault or to have placed a person in reasonable 
apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person . . . for which a 
court may issue an ex parte order pursuant to section 1320.”). 
 118. See generally Jack M. Dagleish, Annotation, Construction and Effect of Statutes 
Mandating Consideration of, or Creating Presumptions Regarding, Domestic Violence in 
Awarding Custody of Children, 51 A.L.R.5th 241 (1997) (Supp. Sept. 2000). 
 119. Cases decided in and anecdotal reports from the states that give domestic 
violence great weight but do not have an actual rebuttable presumption against 
awarding custody to a perpetrator will not be included here, as they are beyond 
the scope of this article.  See, e.g., Bartholf v. Bartholf, 619 N.W.2d 308 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2000).  Anna Farber Conrad, Criminal Justice Advocacy Director of the 
Colorado Coalition Against Domestic Violence, stated that Colorado judges often 
do not see any correlation between partner abuse and custody issues, and may not 
allow domestic violence experts to testify at custody trials. E-mail from Anna 
Farber Conrad, Criminal Justice Advocacy Director of the Colorado Coalition 
Against Domestic Violence to author, Professor of Law, University of California at 
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are some problems with implementation found in the appellate 
cases.  These include a lack of guidance for judges as to what 
factors should be considered in determining whether the 
presumption has been raised or overcome. 
The jurisdictions will be discussed in roughly the order in 
which they adopted the rebuttable presumption, with the most 
experienced jurisdictions first, followed by those which have 
moderate experience with this statute, and finishing with 
jurisdictions where the presumption is very new.  Looking at the 
jurisdictions in rough chronological order is useful in determining 
whether the initial problems presented by the enactment of such 
statutes, if any, are eventually resolved over time. 
2.  Jurisdictions With Many Years Experience Applying the 
Presumption 
a.  North Dakota 
North Dakota has by far the most reported appellate decisions 
applying the rebuttable presumption, having enacted its first such 
statute in 1991.120  Notably, the statute has been amended several 
times in response to some of these decisions.121  While the North 
Dakota Supreme Court has had to restate the basic rules many 
times (for example, that the trial courts must make findings as to 
whether domestic violence occurred), it appears that the statute is 
effective in ensuring that domestic violence is taken seriously in 
custody decisions. 
The first North Dakota case decided under the new 
presumption was Schestler v. Schestler.122  In this case, the wife’s 
evidence of domestic violence by the husband was found to have 
triggered the presumption.123  However, the court then held that 
 
Berkeley (June 18, 2001).  See also Caven v. Caven, 966 P.2d 1247 (Wash. 1998) 
(relying on the plain language of the statute to conclude that the father’s history 
of domestic violence restricted the trial court’s discretion in determining whether 
the parents should mutually make decisions about the children). 
 120. North Dakota, like several other less populous states, has no intermediate 
appellate court, so whenever a trial court decision is appealed, it is heard by the 
state supreme court. 
 121. See Kathleen B. Garner, Infants, Parent and Child: Applying the Rebuttable 
Presumption Against Awarding Custody to Perpetrators of Domestic Violence, Heck v. 
Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1995), 72 N.D. L. REV. 155 (1996). 
 122. 486 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1992). 
 123. Id. at 511-12. 
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the husband had rebutted the presumption.124  This holding was 
upheld by the Supreme Court, which stated that domestic violence 
had no priority over the other best interest factors.125  Thus the 
presumption could be rebutted by the customary weighing of those 
factors.  A strong dissent by one of the justices argued that this 
interpretation of the statute rendered the new law meaningless.126  
This dissent was later quoted with approval in several North Dakota 
Supreme Court cases.127 
As a result of this decision, the statute was amended the 
following year, 1993, to clarify that the presumption could be 
rebutted only by showing clear and convincing evidence that the 
best interests of the child require the perpetrator to be the 
custodian.128  This raised the evidentiary standard from the previous 
one, which had required only “credible evidence” for rebuttal.129  
However, at no time has the statute given courts guidance in terms 
of what is necessary to rebut the presumption.  The courts have had 
to determine this on a case by case basis. 
The amended statute produced a great number of appellate 
decisions in the following few years.  In 1995, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court decided five cases on this topic, three of which 
dealt with rebuttal issues130 and two with what triggers the 
presumption.131 
In Heck v. Reed,132 the first case decided in 1995, the court 
stated that the rebuttal of the presumption requires compelling or 
exceptional circumstances demonstrating that the best interests of 
the child require custody to be placed in perpetrator.133  Thus, the 
trial court may not consider the absence of abuse directed at the 
children as a factor rebutting the presumption.  The court 
discussed the negative effect of domestic violence on children even 
 
 124. Id. at 512. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 515 (Levine, J., dissenting).  For a discussion of this case see Garner, 
supra note 121, at 158-61. 
 127. These include Helbling v. Helbling, 532 N.W.2d 650 (N.D. 1995), Krank 
v. Krank, 529 N.W.2d 844 (N.D. 1995), and Ryan v. Fleming, 533 N.W.2d 920 
(N.D. 1995). 
 128. Garner, supra note 121, at 160-61. 
 129. Id. at 161. 
 130. Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1995); Helbling, 532 N.W.2d at 650; 
Bruner v. Hager, 534 N.W.2d 825 (N.D. 1995). 
 131. Krank, 529 N.W.2d at 844; Ryan, 533 N.W.2d at 920. 
 132. 529 N.W.2d at 155. 
 133. Id. at 162. 
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if they are not directly abused.134  Furthermore, there was no 
evidence that the father had gone to counseling or was no longer 
violent.135 
Next came Krank v. Krank,136 in which the court addressed the 
issue of what level of violence is necessary to raise the presumption, 
with the high court holding that a single act could do this.137  The 
court reversed an award of joint legal custody and sole physical 
custody to the batterer father.138  It remanded the case for findings 
on whether the alleged domestic violence had occurred.139  This 
analysis was necessary in order to respond to the allegations of 
mutual violence.140  The court stated that if one parent were the 
more significant abuser, the presumption should apply only to that 
parent, but if both parties were equally violent, the court should 
apply the general best interest factors.141 
In Helbling v. Helbling,142 the court found that the presumption 
had been raised and not rebutted.143  The appellate court reversed 
the award of custody to the batterer father and remanded the 
case.144  Since both parties had alleged violence by each other, the 
high court directed the trial court to determine which one was the 
most significant abuser.145  Only in Ryan v. Flemming,146 did the court 
find that the presumption had not arisen at all, even though the 
father admitted having broken a flower pot and tearing the phone 
out of the wall.147  The court stated that because the incident 
resulted in no injury to the mother, and was isolated and remote in 
time, it did not trigger the presumption.148  In Bruner v. Hager,149 the 
 
 134. Id. at 164. 
 135. Id. at 165. 
 136. Krank, 529 N.W.2d at 844. 
 137. Id. at 850. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. 532 N.W.2d 650 (N.D. 1995). 
 143. Id. at 653. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. 533 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1995). 
 147. Id. at 924.  These acts would suffice to trigger the presumption in some 
states. See for example, the California Family Code section 3044, which includes 
destruction of personal property in its definition of domestic violence through a 
cross-reference to sections 6203 and 6320.  See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3044(d), 6203, 
6320 (West Supp. 2001). 
 148. Ryan, 533 N.W.2d at 924. 
 149. 534 N.W.2d 825 (N.D. 1995). 
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trial court’s award of custody to the batterer father was reversed, 
with the court stating that now domestic violence is the paramount 
factor in a custody decision where such violence has occurred.150  
Similar to the holding in Heck v. Reed,151 the North Dakota Supreme 
Court stated that the father’s cessation of substance abuse in Bruner 
and fact that he had not physically abused the children did not 
rebut the presumption.152 
The following year the North Dakota Supreme Court decided 
five more cases interpreting this statute.  In the first, Owan v. 
Owan,153 there were allegations of mutual violence; the high court 
directed the trial court not to rely on the father’s expert witness to 
assess his trial testimony, but instead to make its own findings as to 
whether domestic violence had been perpetrated or not and by 
whom.154  In Engh v. Jensen,155 the high court again reversed the trial 
court, which had also awarded custody to the batterer father.156  
The high court explained that the father’s mere separation from 
the mother was insufficient to rebut the presumption.157  In 
Anderson v. Hensrud,158 the court held that the presumption is not 
confined to situations in which a parent or child is the direct victim 
of the domestic violence, since the statute defines domestic 
violence to include any family or household member.159  In Kraft v. 
Kraft,160 the appellate court held that domestic violence by the 
mother’s fiance, who lived with the mother and her children, could 
potentially rebut the presumption against custody to the father, 
who had been violent toward the mother in the past.161  In Ternes v. 
Ternes,162 one parent’s attempt to show that the other parent was 
violent was not raised at the trial court level, thus was not 
something the high court could address.163 
 
 150. Id. at 828-29. 
 151. 529 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1995). 
 152. Bruner, 534 N.W.2d at 828. 
 153. 541 N.W.2d 719 (N.D. 1996). 
 154. Id. at 722-23. 
 155. 547 N.W.2d 922 (N.D. 1996). 
 156. Id. at 923. 
 157. Id. at 926. 
 158. 548 N.W.2d 410 (N.D. 1996). 
 159. Id. at 413. 
 160. 554 N.W.2d 657 (N.D. 1996). 
 161. Id. at 661. 
 162. 555 N.W.2d 355 (N.D. 1996). 
 163. Id. at 358-59.  While this may have been a strategy decision on the part of 
the victim parent’s attorney, it is more likely to have been an oversight, in which 
case it is an example of the importance of training family law attorneys about any 
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The North Dakota statute was most recently amended effective 
April 3, 1997 as an emergency measure.164  The amendment 
provided that the presumption could be triggered if “there exists 
one incident of domestic violence which resulted in serious bodily 
injury or involved the use of a dangerous weapon or there exists a 
pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to 
the proceeding.”165 
The North Dakota Supreme Court also produced five cases 
about the rebuttable presumption in 1997.  Kluck v. Kluck,166 the 
first case that year, involved allegations of mutual abuse.167  The 
high court upheld the trial court’s assessment that one parent’s 
violent conduct was significantly greater than the other’s.168  In 
Zuger v. Zuger,169 the high court reversed a joint custody award 
where the presumption had been raised and had not been 
sufficiently rebutted.170  The high court stated that the trial court’s 
finding that the victim parent was over-protective, that the violence 
would not occur again, and that the violence was not directed at 
the children was insufficient to rebut the presumption.171 
In Dinius v. Dinius,172 the high court applied the new 
amendment and held that the acts of domestic violence were too 
remote in time and too minor to trigger the presumption.173  In 
Zimmerman v. Zimmerman,174 the high court again reversed the trial 
court and remanded the case because the trial court had failed to 
determine which parent had been the more significant abuser.175  
In Huesers v. Huesers,176 the high court also reversed the trial court, 
which had refused to consider the new amendment.177  It held that 
the trial court should use the new amendment as a guide to 
determine whether pre-amendment conduct was sufficient to 
 
statutes involving domestic violence. 
 164. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) (1979) (amended 1997). 
 165. Id. 
 166. 561 N.W.2d 263 (N.D. 1997). 
 167. Id. at 267. 
 168. Id. at 268. 
 169. 563 N.W.2d 804 (N.D. 1997). 
 170. Id. at 810. 
 171. Id. 
 172. 564 N.W.2d 300 (N.D. 1997). 
 173. Id. at 303. 
 174. 569 N.W.2d 277 (N.D. 1997). 
 175. Id. at 279. 
 176. 574 N.W.2d 880 (N.D. 1997). 
 177. Id. at 882. 
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invoke the presumption.178 
In 1998, two cases on this topic were published.  In Kasprowicz 
v. Kasprowicz,179 the high court reversed the trial court, giving two 
reasons.180  First, the high court reversed and remanded because 
the trial court failed to make a factual finding in support of their 
decision to grant rotating custody.181  In addition, the court also 
reversed and remanded the trial court to apply the amended 
presumption statute if applicable.182  In Carver v. Miller,183 the high 
court upheld the trial court’s finding that the presumption against 
the batterer father had been rebutted by the mother’s drug use and 
exposure of the child to a drug-related atmosphere.184 
In 1999, the Supreme Court returned to its earlier volume of 
cases, issuing five rebuttable presumption decisions.  In three of 
these, the presumption was found inapplicable because the 
standard for triggering it established in the 1997 statutory 
amendment was not met.185  In the first, Reeves v. Chepulis,186 the 
high court upheld the trial court’s award of custody to the father.187  
While there was one episode of domestic violence by the father, it 
did not rise to the level required to trigger the presumption.188  In 
Green v. Green,189 the court reiterated that clear and convincing 
evidence was required to rebut the presumption.190  In Schumacher 
v. Schumacher,191 there were allegations of mutual abuse.192  The 
court held that even though the wife had slapped the husband 
twice, his violence against her was worse, thus triggering the 
presumption against him.193  In Holtz v. Holtz,194 the court held that 
 
 178. Id. at 882-83. 
 179. 575 N.W.2d 921 (N.D. 1998). 
 180. Id. at 924. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. 585 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1998). 
 184. Id. at 143-44.  These rebuttal factors are not typical of those found in 
statutes which specify such factors.  Given the lack of rebuttal factors in the North 
Dakota statute, trial courts must make this determination on a case by case basis. 
 185. Reeves v. Chepulis, 591 N.W.2d 791 (N.D. 1999); Green v. Green, 593 
N.W.2d 398 (N.D. 1999); Brown v. Brown, 600 N.W.2d 869 (N.D. 1999). 
 186. 591 N.W.2d at 791. 
 187. Id. at 797. 
 188. Id. at 795. 
 189. 593 N.W.2d at 398. 
 190. Id. at 400. 
 191. 598 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1999). 
 192. Id. at 134-35. 
 193. Id. at 136. 
 194. 595 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1999). 
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the presumption also applied to dating relationships, cohabitants, 
and former cohabitants.195  In Brown v. Brown,196 the high court 
upheld the trial court’s finding that the presumption had not been 
triggered where there were allegations of mutual abuse.197  Neither 
party was seriously injured and neither party’s behavior established 
a pattern sufficient to trigger the rebuttable presumption.198  The 
high court further stated that “[d]omestic violence under [the] 
statute does not include name-calling.”199 
In 2000, the court decided only two cases in which the 
presumption against custody to perpetrators was at issue.  In Cox v. 
Cox,200 the court held that the wife’s evidence of domestic violence 
by the husband was insufficient to trigger the presumption, in spite 
of evidence that he had hit her car once and bruised her in several 
places another time.201  The court stated that it did not find most of 
her allegations credible.202  In Tulintseff v. Jacobsen,203 the court 
interpreted the phrase “reasonable time proximate to the 
proceeding,” a prerequisite to raising the presumption under 
current statute, if there is no evidence of use of a dangerous 
weapon or serious bodily injury.204  The trial court held that abuse 
which had occurred three or more years before the wife filed a 
request to modify joint custody to sole custody was too remote to 
raise the presumption.205  This was upheld by the Supreme Court.206 
 
 195. Id. at 9. 
 196. 600 N.W.2d 869 (N.D. 1999). 
 197. Id. at 873. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 874.  This last comment is significant because the court is thereby 
excluding emotional abuse, the most frequent form of domestic violence, and 
according to victims, the most damaging, as unlike physical violence, it tends to be 
continuous, chipping away at the victim’s self esteem until she feels powerless.  See 
Pincolini, supra note 56, at 7; DUTTON & GOLANT, supra note 78, at 23, 140.  Of 
course, including emotional abuse in the definition of domestic violence would 
also open the door to a backlash from perpetrators, who often say that they feel 
emotionally abused by their victims. 
 200. 613 N.W.2d 516 (N.D. 2000). 
 201. Id. at 521. 
 202. Id. 
 203. 615 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 2000). 
 204. North Dakota’s presumption statute creates a rebuttable presumption 
against awarding custody to the perpetrator of domestic violence under three 
circumstances: (1) if “there exists one incident of domestic violence which 
resulted in serious bodily injury,” (2) if “there exists one incident of domestic 
violence which involved the use of a dangerous weapon,” or (3) if “there exists a 
pattern of domestic violence within a reasonable time proximate to the 
preceeding.”  N. D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1)(j) (1999). 
 205. Tulintseff, 615 N.W.2d at 134.  The trial court also stated that the 
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So far, the North Dakota Supreme Court has decided only one 
case on point in 2001, Hurt v. Hurt.207  In that case, the court 
upheld the custody award to the wife, based partly on the history of 
domestic violence.208  Notably, the trial court rejected the 
recommendation of the guardian ad litem.209  With no explanation, 
the trial court found that the presumption was not triggered even 
though the wife had obtained orders of protection and had taken 
the children with her to a domestic violence shelter twice, shortly 
before filing for divorce.210  The appellate court did not reverse this 
finding.211  Since the presumption was not raised, the domestic 
violence by the husband was considered as part of the best interest 
analysis, along with an overall assessment of each party’s parenting 
abilities.212 
Overall it is clear that the presumption statute has been taken 
seriously in North Dakota.  It is also clear that frequent appellate 
review is key to actually changing trial court practices. 
b.  Louisiana 
Louisiana adopted the rebuttable presumption in 1992, with 
very mixed results.  In the first case to interpret the statute, Simmons 
v. Simmons,213 the appellate court held that a single past act of 
violence is not a “history of perpetrating family violence,” which 
would have triggered the statutory presumption against the award 
of custody to a perpetrator.214  The court reasoned that this 
determination must be based on a review of the total circumstances 
of the family and involves the weighing of evidence.215  In this case, 
 
husband’s breaking a table, two chairs, a stairway railing, and a mirror did not 
constitute domestic violence.  Id. at 133 n.2.  This was because, according to the 
trial court, there was no evidence that these actions caused the wife to feel afraid 
that the husband would harm her.  Id. 
 206. Id. at 134-35.  This finding, upheld by the appellate court, shows the 
danger of defining domestic violence too narrowly in statutes creating 
presumptions against custody to batterers. 
 207. 621 N.W.2d 326 (N.D. 2001). 
 208. Id. at 330. 
 209. Id. at 331. 
 210. Id. at 330.  “The evidence of domestic violence presented to the trial 
court did not trigger the rebuttable presumption under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-
06.2(1)(j).”  Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 328-31. 
 213. 649 So. 2d 799 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
 214. Id. at 801. 
 215. Id. at 802. 
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the appellate court agreed that the trial court did not err in 
refusing to apply the presumption.216  The wife claimed that she 
had needed both police and medical assistance as a result of the 
husband’s violence but could document only one incident.217  The 
husband stated that the abuse had never taken place in front of the 
children and was provoked by the wife’s adulterous affair.218  The 
husband was upheld as the primary domiciliary parent, principally 
because he was more stable geographically.219 
In Michelli v. Michelli,220 decided later that same year, another 
circuit of the appellate court held that the family violence does not 
have to have been frequent or continuous before the presumption 
is triggered.221  In that case, the trial court had held that the 
presumption was not triggered in spite of evidence of numerous 
incidents of physical abuse by the husband, some of which were 
documented and witnessed by third parties.222  The trial court 
referred to the abuse as mutual “family fights,” discounting 
evidence that the wife was defending herself.223  However, this time 
the appellate court disagreed, holding that it was reversible error 
not to allow the wife to submit a proffer of evidence concerning the 
criminal charges against the husband,224 and that the trial court 
should have found that the presumption was triggered by the 
evidence of the many incidents of abuse.225 
Subdivision (A) of the statute was amended in 1995 to clarify 
that a history of perpetrating family violence means either one 
incident resulting in serious bodily injury or more than one 
incident.226  This was presumably a response to the Simmons 
holding. 
Two years later, the Louisiana Court of Appeal decided 
Morrison v. Morrison.227  The court upheld the award of provisional 
custody to the mother, based on the presumption.228  The court 
 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 800. 
 219. Id. at 802-03. 
 220. 655 So.2d 1342 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
 221. Id. at 1349. 
 222. Id. at 1347-48. 
 223. Id. at 1348. 
 224. Id. at 1350. 
 225. Id. at 1349. 
 226. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(a) (West 2000). 
 227. 699 So.2d 1124 (La. Ct. App. 1997). 
 228. Id. at 1127. 
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found that both parents had a history of perpetrating family 
violence.229  However, the court additionally found that the mother 
was less likely to continue to do so than was the father.230  This is a 
statutory consideration.231  However, the court remanded the case 
so that the trial court could order the mother to participate in and 
complete a treatment program, due to her history of violence 
toward the father, as required by statute.232  The final decision was 
contingent on the mother’s completing this program.233 
The following year, the Louisiana appellate court decided 
Raney v. Wren.234  In that case, the trial court ordered that the 
parents have joint custody, with the father as the domiciliary 
parent.235  In her motion to modify the ruling, filed a year later, the 
wife alleged that she signed the original consent judgment only 
because of the husband’s abusive behavior and threats.236  However, 
her motion was denied by the trial court.237  The trial court found 
that the earlier abuse was not relevant and that her allegations were 
not credible, thus the presumption against custody to batterers was 
inapplicable.238  The trial court stated that it preferred the father as 
custodian because he was more stable geographically.239  The 
appellate court upheld the custody order.240  A concurring judge 
argued that it was error to exclude evidence of the father’s 
domestic violence, as this was relevant to his fitness as a parent 
regardless of whether it took place before or after the stipulated 
order.241  However, even this judge felt that the exclusion was 
 
 229. Id. at 1126-27. 
 230. Id. at 1127. 
 231. Louisiana’s presumptive statute provides: “If the court finds that both 
parents have a history of perpetrating family violence, custody shall be awarded 
solely to the parent who is less likely to continue to perpetrate family violence.”  
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(B) (West 2000). 
 232. Morrison, 699 So. 2d at 1127.  Completion of a treatment program are 
mandated by section 9:364(B).  Id. at 1128.  Such treatment programs are defined 
by section 9:362(7).  Id. 
 233. Id.  The father was ordered to complete a treatment program before he 
could engage in any form of visitation, as required by the statute.  Id. 
 234. 722 So. 2d 54 (La. Ct. App. 1998). 
 235. Id. at 55. 
 236. Id. at 58. 
 237. Id. at 56, 58. 
 238. Id. at 58. 
 239. Id. at 60.  The mother had remarried, and her new husband was in the 
Navy, so they had to relocate periodically. Id.  at 61. 
 240. Id. at 62. 
 241. Id. at 62-63 (Gonzales, J., concurring). 
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harmless error.242 
In 1999, the court of appeals decided Hicks v. Hicks243 and 
McGee v. McGee.244  In the Hicks case, the award of joint custody with 
the husband having primary custody during the school year was 
reversed due to the trial court’s failure to comply with the 
presumption.245  In spite of uncontroverted evidence of severe 
domestic violence by the husband, the trial court did not apply the 
presumption statute, instead the court used a best interests 
analysis.246  In reversing this, the appellate court also explicitly 
rejected language from the Simmons247 court.248  The Simmons court 
had added two more factors to the statutory language: 1) whether 
the violence occurred in the presence of the children, and 
2)whether the violence was provoked.249 
In McGee,250 using a best interests analysis, the same court 
upheld the trial court’s award of joint custody with the husband 
having primary custody.251  The court stated that a single specific 
incident of family violence was insufficient to trigger the 
presumption.252  There were allegations of mutual abuse.253  Both 
parties were arrested during one incident, but apparently neither 
was actually injured and thus not meeting the statutory 
requirement that there be serious bodily injury if there was only 
one incident. 
The following year the appellate court decided Harper v. 
Harper.254  This time, based on a best interest analysis, the award of 
sole custody to the mother was upheld.255  The father had not 
abused the mother since they separated very early in the 
relationship.256  However, the father had been physically abusive to 
his prior wife and children.257  Without explanation, the appellate 
 
 242. Id. at 63. 
 243. 733 So. 2d 1261 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
 244. 745 So. 2d 708 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
 245. 733 So. 2d at 1262. 
 246. Id. at 1263. 
 247. Simmons v. Simmons, 649 So. 2d 799 (La. Ct. App. 1995). 
 248. 733 So. 2d at 1265-66. 
 249. Simmons, 649 So. 2d at 802. 
 250. McGee v. McGee, 745 So. 2d 708 (La. Ct. App. 1999). 
 251. Id. at 712. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 711-12. 
 254. 764 So. 2d 1186 (La. Ct. App. 2000). 
 255. Id. at 1190. 
 256. Id. at 1187, 1190. 
 257. Id. at 1191. 
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court did not mention the presumption against custody to 
perpetrators, even though it is not limited to abuse against the 
other parent or the child whose custody is at issue.258  The court 
considered the statutory presumption favoring joint custody, 
though it found that the mother had overcome this, based partly 
on the father’s history of violence and partly on his failure to 
establish a relationship with the child.259  The fact that the court 
would even consider awarding joint custody to a batterer and child 
abuser is, of course, cause for great concern. 
The most recent Louisiana case on point is Lewis v. Lewis.260  In 
this case the presumption was key to the holding.  The trial court 
had found that the husband abused the wife.261  Nonetheless, the 
trial court awarded the parties joint custody, with the husband as 
primary domiciliary parent, refusing to apply the provisions of the 
presumption statute.262  The appellate court held that the refusal 
was reversible legal error, noting that the husband had admitted to 
having abused the wife on more than one occasion.263  The court 
used this fact to distinguish the case from Simmons264 and triggered 
the presumption.265  The husband had also alleged that the wife was 
violent towards him.266  However, the appellate court held that the 
abuse had occurred on only one occasion, did not result in serious 
injury and thus did not trigger the presumption.267  It further held 
that the husband had not rebutted the presumption, awarding the 
wife custody and the husband supervised visitation until he satisfied 
all the statutory requirements.268  Both parents were ordered to 
complete parenting classes.269 
 
 
 258. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364(A) (West 2000) (stating that “no parent 
who has a history of perpetrating family violence shall be awarded sole or joint 
custody of children,” but not specifying that such family violence may be 
considered solely in reference to the other parent seeking custody or the child 
whose custody is at issue). 
 259. Harper, 764 So. 2d at 1190. 
 260. 771 So. 2d 856 (La. Ct. App. 2000). 
 261. Id. at 858. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 860. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 861-62. 
 267. Id. at 862. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
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3.  Jurisdictions With A Moderate Amount of Experience Applying 
the Presumption 
a.  Jurisdictions with No Appellate Cases 
In many of the jurisdictions that have had the presumption for 
some years, there is not yet any appellate law involving custody 
cases with allegations of abuse from one adult partner toward 
another.  These jurisdictions include the District of Columbia, 
Hawaii, Idaho, and South Dakota.  However, advocates in three of 
these have commented on their experience with the statutes. 
(1) District of Columbia 
The presumption in the District of Columbia applies only in 
cases where the court is considering an award of joint custody.270  
One attorney specializing in domestic violence family law cases 
there stated that batterers are now going to court quickly to file for 
civil protective orders in order to benefit from this presumption.271  
She also reported that batterers are zealously opposing such orders 
in order to prevent the court from finding that the presumption 
has been triggered.272  She noted that if the court finds that this 
presumption has not been raised, the court then applies another 
presumption, favoring joint custody.273 
A clinical professor at Georgetown University Law School 
stated that while the statute274 requires judges to give written 
statements specifying factors and findings supporting custody to 
batterers, she believes that this section is “usually ignored.”275  In 
any event, she was not sure that an appellate decision requiring 
judges to make such findings would actually alter the outcomes, 
given the frame of mind of the trial court judges.276 
 
 270. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a)(5) (1997). 
 271. E-mail from Susana SáCouto, attorney at W.E.A.V.E. (Women Escaping A 
Violent Environment) in Washington D.C. to author, Professor of Law, University 
of California at Berkeley (June 15, 2001) (on file with author). 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id.  See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911(a)(5) (1997). 
 274. Id. § 16-911(a)(1). 
 275. E-mail from Prof. Lisa DeSanctis, clinical professor at Georgetown 
University Law School, to author, Lecturer, University of California at Berkeley 
(June 13, 2001) (on file with author). 
 276. Id. 
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(2) Hawaii 
Hawaii adopted its presumption statute in 1996.277  A lawyer 
specializing in domestic violence family law cases says that the 
judicial response has been quite mixed.278  While there have been 
no problems regarding the issuance of restraining orders, if the 
batterer agrees to the order, no finding of domestic violence is 
made.279  When findings are made, the issue of the violence is 
usually not re-litigated in the later divorce proceeding, but the 
impact the violence has had on the children often is.280 
In terms of what is required to rebut the presumption, some 
judges require the batterer to have had “a major turnaround,” or 
evidence that the victim is an active drug user or has a mental 
illness.281  Other judges take the position that if the batterer has not 
hit anyone recently and has taken some classes for batterers he has 
overcome the presumption.282  One of the main problems is that 
the guardians ad litem do not apply the new statute correctly, and 
often see the presumption as very easily rebutted.283  The judges 
tend to place great weight on the recommendation of these 
guardians.284 
However, according to this attorney, victims of domestic 
violence who have competent counsel have a great success rate in 
terms of getting custody, often at the settlement stage.285  On the 
other hand, unrepresented litigants and those with attorneys who 
think domestic violence is not that relevant to custody do poorly.286 
The attorney also noted that the statute used to include a 
provision that if the judge awarded custody to a perpetrator, he or 
she had to make written findings regarding how the presumption 
was overcome and how the safety of the adult victim and the 
 
 277. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46 (Michie 1999). 
 278. E-mail from an anonymous source in Hawaii to author, Professor of Law, 
University of California at  (July 18, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Anonymous E-mail]. 
 279. This attorney noted that issuance of orders without findings raises the 
question whether there is subject matter jurisdiction.  Id.  She will be discussing 
this with the judiciary soon.  Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. 
36
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss2/2
04_FORMAT.LEMON.10.12.01.DOC 11/1/2001  5:58 PM 
2001 REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST CUSTODY 637 
children had been considered.287  With no notice to the public or 
opportunity to comment, this provision was mysteriously removed 
when the statute was amended for some other purpose.288  While 
the advocates have been trying to get the provision reinstated, the 
judges’ association testified against this legislation, saying it would 
create too much work for them.289 
(3) South Dakota 
South Dakota passed its presumption statute in 1997.290  The 
Director of the South Dakota Coalition Against Domestic Violence 
and Sexual Assault reported that they have had better luck with the 
law than anticipated.291  While there are still major problems with 
custody cases involving domestic violence, the situation is better 
than before.292  Like many of the respondents around the country, 
this advocate reported that it is hard to get the judges to come to 
training on domestic violence.293  She noted that there must be a 
conviction before the presumption is triggered, and there are few 
convictions since the prosecutors tend to agree to “deferred 
prosecution.”294  But overall the law is working, and the Chief 
Justice of the South Dakota Supreme Court has been proactive on 
domestic violence issues generally, setting a positive tone.295 
b.  Jurisdictions With Appellate Cases 
In several of the states where the presumption has been in 
effect for a few years, appellate courts have interpreted the 
 
 287. Hawaii statute states that “[a] court may award visitation to a parent who 
commited family violence only if the court finds that adequate provisions for the 
physical safety and psychological well-being of the child and adequate provision 
for the safety of the parent who is a victim of family violence can be made.”  HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN.. § 517-46(10) (Michie 1999). 
 288. Anonymous E-mail, supra note 279. 
 289. Id. 
 290. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45.5 (Michie 1999). 
 291. Telephone Conversation Verlaine Gullickson, Director of the South 
Dakota Coalition Against Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault, with author (Aug. 
10, 2001). 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id.  Ms. Gullickson also noted the biggest problem presented by these 
cases is the judges’ refusal to order that the batterers relinquish their firearms, as 
mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) and (9).  Id.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) & (9) 
(1994 & Supp. 1999) (other sections have been held unconstitutional). 
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presumption, with very mixed results.  These include Alabama, 
Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, and 
Oklahoma. 
(1) Alabama 
Alabama enacted a rebuttable presumption statute effective 
July 31, 1995.296  The statute appears to have had a significant effect, 
judging from the outcome of the appellate decisions. 
Most of the cases citing the statute emphasize the need for trial 
courts to make written findings regarding any allegations of abuse 
so that the appellate courts can determine whether the 
presumption has been triggered, and if so, whether it has been 
rebutted.297  So far this has occurred in six cases; in all of these, the 
trial courts had awarded primary physical custody to the fathers, all 
of whom were allegedly batterers, but the appellate courts reversed 
and remanded the cases.298 
However, in the most recent case on point in Alabama, Ex parte 
Fann,299 the Alabama Supreme Court held that it was not automatic 
grounds for reversal for the trial court to fail to make a finding on 
the record as to whether domestic abuse had in fact occurred.300  In 
the process, the high court overruled Fesmire v. Fesmire.301  While the 
high court agreed that such a finding is useful so that the appellate 
court can determine whether the trial court actually applied the 
appropriate statute, it characterized the failure to make such a 
finding as harmless error.302  The high court stated in its reasoning 
that the statute itself did not specifically require such a finding, nor 
 
 296. ALA. CODE § 30-3-151 (1995). 
 297. See A.S. v. G.T., No. 2000264, 2001 WL 259278, at *2 (Ala. Civ. App. Mar. 
16, 2001); Nye v. Nye, 785 So. 2d 1147, 1149 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000); Ray v. Ray, 782 
So. 2d 797, 798 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000); Davis v. Davis, 743 So. 2d 486, 487 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1999); Fesmire v. Fesmire, 738 So. 2d 1284, 1285 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999); M.J.Y. 
v. J.S.Y., 758 So. 2d 571, 574 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999). 
 298. A.S., 2001 WL 259278 at *2-3; Nye, 785 So. 2d at 1151; Ray, 782 So. 2d at 
799; Davis, 743 So. 2d at 487; Fesmire, 738 So. 2d at 1287-88; M.J.Y., 758 So. 2d at 
574. 
 299. Ex parte Fann, No. 1992227, 2001 WL 793009 (Ala. July 13, 2001). 
 300. Id. at *7. 
 301. 738 So. 2d 1284 (Ala. Ct. App. 1999).  Fesmire held that if allegations of 
domestic abuse have been made, then “the trial court must, on the basis of the 
evidence presented, make a finding on the record as to whether domestic abuse 
occurred and then . . . it must apply the remaining provisions of the Custody and 
Domestic or Family Abuse Act.”  Id. at 1288. 
 302. Ex parte Fann, 2001 WL 793009, at *3. 
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did it actually require that the trial court state any reason for its 
order.303  The state supreme court also stated in dicta that there 
were many factors besides domestic violence committed by a parent 
which should be given great weight in custody determinations but 
which were not mentioned in the custody statute.304 
The Alabama appellate court has also addressed other issues 
presented by the statute.  The first case to mention the new statute 
was Kent v. Green,305 in which the appellate court upheld the custody 
award to the father in spite of his history of violence toward the 
mother.306  At one point the mother had to be hospitalized due to 
the father’s choking her.307  Applying a best interests test, the 
majority opinion did not mention the new statute, which had 
become effective after the action was filed.308  The majority stated 
that the father was unlikely to be violent in the future, and that the 
violence had not been directed toward the child.309  The dissent 
argued that it was an abuse of discretion to award custody to the 
father and not to appoint a guardian ad litem.310  Additionally, 
given the enactment of the new statute, which arguably could 
apply, it argued that the case should be remanded to the trial 
court.311 
The following year the appellate court decided Jackson v. 
Jackson,312 the first Alabama case in which the presumption against 
custody to a batterer was applied.313  The trial court awarded joint 
custody based on a statutory preference for this.314  The court did 
not mention the new domestic violence statute and concluded that 
the parents were equally fit.315  The appellate court held that 
because the domestic violence statute was more specific than the 
joint custody statute, the former controls.316  Thus in domestic 
violence cases, the court may not consider joint custody unless the 
 
 303. Id. at *5. 
 304. Id. 
 305. 701 So. 2d 4 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). 
 306. Id. at 6. 
 307. Id. at 5. 
 308. See id. at 5-6. 
 309. Id. at 5. 
 310. Id. at 6. 
 311. Id. at 9. 
 312. 709 So. 2d 46 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997). 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 47. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. at 47-48. 
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perpetrator has rebutted the presumption against custody to him 
or her.317  Since the wife’s evidence had raised the presumption, the 
case was reversed and remanded to determine whether the 
husband could rebut it.318 
In 1998, the appellate court decided Harbert v. Harbert,319 in 
which both parents sought to modify the split custody 
arrangement.320  Three years after their divorce, the mother was 
granted a restraining order based on the father’s recent abuse of 
her.321  At the subsequent custody hearing, the trial court refused to 
hear the children’s testimony or to accept an offer of proof.322  It 
then granted the father’s request for joint custody.323  The appellate 
court held that this was reversible error, as was issuing the 
restraining order without making a finding that abuse had or had 
not occurred.324  It also reminded the trial court that joint custody 
could not be awarded in domestic violence cases until the 
perpetrator had rebutted the presumption against custody to 
him.325 
The following year the court decided E.M.C. v. K.C.Y.,326 
involving a modification of a joint custody order with primary 
physical custody to the father.327  The trial court granted the 
mother’s request to modify this to sole custody to her.328  The father 
was not only abusive to the mother and child, but also had a violent 
outburst in court.329  Citing the statutory presumption against 
custody to batterers, the appellate court held that joint custody was 
not in the best interest of the child, and that the father should not 
even be allowed visitation until he receives “professional 
counseling.”330 
More recently the Alabama appellate court decided Howard v. 
 
 317. Id. at 48. 
 318. Id. 
 319. 721 So. 2d 224, 224 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998). 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 226. 
 322. Id. at 225. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. at 226. 
 325. Id. 
 326. 735 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999). 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 227. 
 329. Id. 
 330. Id. at 1228, 1230. 
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Howard,331 in which the mother was given custody and the father 
appealed.332  The appellate court upheld the trial court’s findings.333  
The appellate court held that the absence of written findings of 
abuse was at most harmless error, as the record showed that the 
father had abused her and the children, and there were no 
allegations that the mother had committed abuse.334  The dissent 
argued that findings were still required in the event that the father 
later filed for modification and in order to determine whether the 
children and mother were adequately protected by the visitation 
order.335  The same result occurred in Ex Parte Fann,336 the first case 
in which the Alabama Supreme Court addressed the issue of the 
presumption statute.  In that case, the court held that lack of a 
finding on the issue of abuse was not automatic grounds for 
reversal. 
(2) Delaware 
There appear to be only two cases interpreting the Delaware 
presumption statute, both quite recent, and in both of which the 
statute was determinative.  The first is a trial court case, J.D.E. v. 
C.K.W.,337in which the custodial mother sought to relocate to 
another state.338  Her new husband and their children had already 
moved there due to the husband’s job.339  The father, who had 
visitation, had been convicted of assaulting the mother, thus 
triggering the presumption.340  However, he had not completed the 
program for perpetrators necessary to rebut it, nor had he 
demonstrated extraordinary circumstances that warrant the 
rejection of the presumption.341  Therefore, the court held that the 
presumption controlled and allowed the mother to move.342  The 
court stated that once the father had completed the batterers’ 
 
 331. No. 2990803, 2001 WL 111261 (Ala. Civ. App. Feb. 9, 2001). 
 332. Id. at *1. 
 333. Id. at *2. 
 334. Id. at *1-2. 
 335. Id. at *2 (Yates, J., dissenting). 
 336. No. 1992227, 2001 WL 793009 (Ala. July 13, 2001). 
 337. No. CN94-11773, 2001 WL 493117 (Del. Fam. Ct. Jan. 25, 2001) 
 338. Id. at *1. 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. at *2.  The Delaware statute does not require a conviction, but merely 
that the parent be a “perpetrator of domestic violence,” which is not defined by 
the statute or case law.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 705A (a) & (b) (1999). 
 341. J.D.E., 2001 WL 493117 at *2. 
 342. Id. at *3. 
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program, a full hearing would be scheduled.343 
The other case, Webb v. Pfusch,344was decided by the Delaware 
Supreme Court.345  In Webb, the father’s visitation rights had been 
suspended by a one-year restraining order.346  The mother was 
granted sole legal custody and primary residential custody.347  The 
father had pled guilty to burglarizing the mother’s residence and 
assaulting her, but claimed that her testimony at the custody 
hearing was false.348  In a very brief opinion, the Delaware Supreme 
Court upheld the trial court’s decision, citing to the presumption 
statute, and holding that there was no merit to any of the father’s 
contentions.349 
(3) Florida 
Florida’s rebuttable presumption statute,350 enacted in 1995, 
has resulted in only four appellate decisions.351  This statute 
requires evidence of a felony conviction before the presumption is 
raised and thus is rarely invoked.352  Judging by both appellate cases 
and comments from attorneys practicing in the state, the statute 
appears to have had little effect on the day-to-day custody decisions 
made by trial courts.353  In fact, the Florida standard for triggering 
the presumption is so high that so far there is no appellate case in 
 
 343. Id. 
 344. No. 275,2000, 2001 WL 760817 (Del. Super. Ct. June 14, 2001). 
 345. There is no intermediate appellate court in Delaware. 
 346. Webb, 2001 WL 760817 at *1. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. 
 350. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13 (1995) (amended by Act of April 16, 2001, ch. 2001-2, 
sec. 1, § 61.13, 2001 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 2001-2 (2001)). 
 351. See Burke v. Watterson, 713 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); 
Fullerton v. Fullerton, 709 So. 2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); Ford v. Ford 700 
So. 2d 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Ward v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996). 
 352. See FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West 1997). 
 353. E-mail from Celia Yapita, attorney in North Central Florida, to author, 
Professor of Law, University of California at  (June 13, 2001) (on file with the 
author).  Ms. Yapita, an attorney specializing in domestic violence civil cases, 
reports that the presumption rarely arises because most abusers are not arrested, 
much less convicted of a felony.  Id.  Most of the judges she has appeared before 
give very little, if any, weight to domestic violence allegations if there are no 
charges or convictions.  Id.  Judges do routinely grant injunctions for protection, 
but they also usually grant unsupervised visitation to abusers.  Id.  Unless the abuse 
is severe and documented, most judges in her area do not believe the violence has 
affected or will affect the children.  Id. 
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which a mother was awarded custody as a result of it.  In the only 
case in which the statute was found applicable, the father had killed 
the mother.354 
In the first appellate case decided after the statute was enacted, 
Ward v. Ward,355 the appellate court upheld the trial court’s transfer 
of primary residential custody from the mother to the father.356  
This occurred in spite of the father’s conviction and imprisonment 
for murdering his first wife.357  The trial court stated that it was 
concerned about the girl’s inappropriate sexual comments and 
behavior, which the court felt came from the custodial mother’s 
being a lesbian.358  The new presumption statute was not raised at 
trial and the mother did not argue on appeal that this was 
fundamental error but only reversible error.359  Therefore, the 
appellate court refused to apply the new statute.360  The court 
concluded that in any event, the father’s remarriage, stable job, 
and ownership of property would seem to support a conclusion 
that he had rebutted the presumption.361 
In the second case, In re Marriage of Ford,362 the appellate court 
reversed the trial court’s award of custody to the father, who had 
admitted abusing the mother but had not been convicted.363  Thus, 
the presumption statute was not triggered, and the court used a 
best interests analysis.364  The trial court found both parents fit, but 
awarded the father custody because he was more likely to 
encourage contact with the mother.365  This followed the “friendly 
parent” provision found in many state statutes.366  The appellate 
 
 354. See Burke v. Watterson, 713 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
 355. 742 So. 2d 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
 356. Id. at 255. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. at 252. 
 359. Id. at 255. 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id.  This case, which received a great deal of publicity nationally, shows 
the lengths to which a conservative court will go in order to prevent a lesbian from 
raising her child. It also demonstrates the need for specific rebuttal factors to be 
included in statutes creating a presumption against the batterer. 
 362. 700 So. 2d 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
 363. Id. at 192. 
 364. Id. at 196. 
 365. Id. at 194. 
 366. Id.  The trial court followed the “friendly parent” provision found in many 
state statutes.  See id.  These “friendly parent presumptions” frequently penalize 
victims of domestic violence.  See Joan Zorza, Protecting the Children in Custody: 
Disputes When One Parent Abuses the Other, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1113, 1122 (1995-
96). 
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court held that the trial court had abused its discretion, because its 
final judgment was “devoid of all but the most minimal mention of 
what undoubtedly became the central focus of the testimony 
presented to the trial court: an established pattern of domestic 
violence perpetrated by the former husband upon the former 
wife.”367  The appellate court also noted that the wife might not be 
“friendly” to the husband due to her justifiable fear of him.368 
The same result is found in Fullerton v. Fullerton,369 where the 
father’s domestic violence toward the mother was the basis for the 
award of custody to her.370  In upholding this, the presumption was 
not mentioned by the appellate court, probably because the father 
was not convicted of the abuse.371 
In Burke v. Watterson,372 the only Florida case in which the 
presumption actually was found to apply, the father had been 
convicted of killing the mother.373  The custody battle was thus 
between the convicted father and the mother’s parents.  The 
appellate court upheld the trial court’s determination that the 
father had not rebutted the presumption.374  The grandparents 
were awarded custody.375 
(4) Iowa 
Iowa enacted its presumption statute in 1995.376  This statute 
applies only to joint custody awards, though domestic violence is 
 
 367. Ford, 700 So. 2d at 195. 
 368. Id. at 196.  Nina Zollo states that the Ford case was very helpful in 
reversing a trial court that had not follow the statute.  Email from Nina Zollo, the 
Legal Director of the Greenberg Traurig/Florida Coalition Against Domestic 
Violence Alliance for Battered Women, to author, Professor of Law, University of 
California at  (June 18, 2001) (on file with author).  She said that this case may be 
why there do not seem to be problems with judges following the statute, or 
unintended consequences.  Id. 
 369. 709 So. 2d 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998). 
 370. Id. at 163. 
 371. Id.  Apparently it is rare in Florida for a batterer to be convicted, as even 
in the largest city in that state, diversion is used in most misdemeanor domestic 
violence cases.  See Dana Canedy, Officials Drop Criminal Charge Arising in Miami 
Mayor’s Spat, N.Y.TIMES, August 7, 2001, at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2001/08/07/national/07MIAMI.html (quoting the Miami-Dade state attorney as 
saying this is the standard disposition for first time offenders charged with 
misdemeanor battery). 
 372. 713 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) 
 373. Id. at 1095. 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. 
 376. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West Supp. 2001). 
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also a best interests factor if the presumption does not apply.377  
Iowa has only three appellate cases on point, two of which call into 
question the usefulness of this limited version of the 
presumption.378  However, in the most recent case, the presumption 
was the key factor in reversing an award of custody to the 
batterer.379 
In the first case, In re Marriage of Ford,380 the trial court awarded 
joint custody, with the husband as primary caretaker.381  The trial 
court appeared to be unaware of the new statute, as the court did 
not mention this in its order, nor did it discuss in any detail the 
evidence creating a presumption against joint custody in domestic 
violence cases.382  In spite of this omission, the Iowa Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court order.383  The Iowa Supreme Court stated 
that the trial court “gave careful thought to the domestic abuse 
issue and found that it was not significant enough to be the sole 
factor in determining custody of the children.”384  The state 
supreme court also held that the husband had rebutted the 
presumption against joint custody by showing changes in his life 
since the last incident of abuse four years earlier.385  These changes 
included getting help from his family and church, becoming an 
active church member, earning his college degree, obtaining a full 
time job, and overcoming his substance abuse problems.386  Though 
he never went to a batterer’s program, the husband was found to 
be the more stable parent, since the wife had moved out to live with 
her boyfriend and left the children with the husband.387 
In the second Iowa case, In re Marriage of Forbes,388the mother 
and father were given joint custody and the father was awarded 
primary physical care even though he had pled guilty to abusing 
 
 377. Id. § 598.41(2)(c). 
 378. See In re Ford, 563 N.W.2d 629 (Iowa 1997); In re Marriage of Forbes, 570 
N.W.2d 757 (Iowa 1997); In re Sulzner, No. 99-1400, 2000 WL 504728, *2 (Iowa Ct. 
App. Apr. 28, 2000). 
 379. In re Sulzner, 2000 WL 504728 at *2. 
 380. 563 N.W.2d 629. 
 381. Id. at 630. 
 382. Id. at 629-34. 
 383. Id. at 634.  Iowa has no intermediate appellate court.  Thus, both cases 
interpreting the statute are from the state supreme court. 
 384. Id. at 632. 
 385. Id. at 632-33. 
 386. Id. at 633. 
 387. Id. at 634.  The Iowa statutes, like most presumption statutes, do not 
include specific rebuttal factors that the court must consider. 
 388. 570 N.W.2d 757 (Iowa 1997). 
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the wife, there were several police reports of his abuse, and the wife 
had obtained a protective order.389  The court found that the wife’s 
discipline of the children was very abusive and that both parents 
had abused each other.390  The trial court failed to discuss the 
presumption statute in its order, or to find whether the 
presumption had been triggered or rebutted.391  In upholding the 
trial court’s order, the Iowa Supreme Court stated that it was not 
sure that the wife had shown a “history” of domestic abuse by the 
husband.392  It further held that the husband had rebutted any 
presumption against him by the evidence that the wife had been 
abusive to him and to the children.393 
In the most recent case, In re Sulzner,394the presumption was the 
key factor in the trial court’s decision to award custody to the 
mother, with supervised visitation to the father.395  The custody 
award was upheld by the appellate court, although the visitation 
issue was remanded, with instructions to order unsupervised 
visitation.396  The father had been convicted of domestic assault 
against the mother.397  The appellate court noted that if there was 
only one documented incident, that might not have triggered the 
presumption.398  However, in this case there was credible evidence 
that the father had repeatedly abused the mother.399  His attempt to 
rebut the presumption by citing his completion of a court-ordered 
batterers’ education program was rejected by the trial court.400  The 
supreme court agreed with this holding, noting that “[the father’s] 
post-separation hostility towards [the mother] suggests he does not 
understand the extent to which his abusive behavior adversely 
affects [the child].”401 
 
 389. Id. at 759. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. at 760. 
 393. Id. 
 394. No. 99-1400, 2000 WL 504728, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2000). 
 395. Id. at *2. 
 396. Id. at *2-*3. 
 397. Id. at *1. 
 398. Id. at *2. 
 399. Id. at *1. 
 400. Id. at *2. 
 401. Id. 
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(5) Massachusetts 
Massachusetts adopted a rebuttable presumption in 1998,402 
which is triggered by a “pattern or serious incident of abuse.”403  
While the statute is not specifically automatically triggered by the 
issuance of a protective order, the underlying facts in the protective 
order can be grounds for a finding of abuse.404  The statute also 
states that the court must make written findings regarding the 
effects of the abuse on the child.405 
While the legislation was pending, the state senate asked the 
state supreme court to given an opinion as to the constitutionality 
of such a presumption.406  The supreme court issued a formal 
opinion, holding that this statute would withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.407  The high court held that the child’s interest in being 
free of abuse and neglect and the state’s interest in promoting the 
welfare of its children outweigh any risk of erroneous deprivation 
of the parental right to a relationship with the child which might 
result from the application of the “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard in a custody proceeding between the parents when there 
is proof of a pattern of abuse or an incident of serious abuse.408 
However, in the only case citing the statute to date, In re 
Custody of Zia,409 the appellate court found the statute 
inapplicable.410  In that case, the father was awarded sole legal and 
physical custody, even though the mother had been the primary 
caretaker and the father had been convicted of a drug offense and 
assault and battery against someone else.411  The mother had also 
 
 402. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 (2001). 
 403. Id.  This is a higher standard than that needed to obtain a protective 
order in Massachusetts, which may be one reason there does not seem to have 
been any judicial reluctance to issue protective orders for fear of triggering the 
presumption against custody to batterers.  E-mail from Doug McCormack, Mass. 
Attorney/advocate to author, Professor of Law at California at  (June 18, 2001) 
(on file with author).  For a discussion of the Massachusetts statute, see generally 
Quirion, supra note 36.  For an argument that prior Massachusetts statutes and 
case law could serve as the basis for a rebuttable presumption even without a 
statute explicitly authorizing this, as well as an argument in favor of such a statute, 
see generally Pauline Quirion et al., supra note 49. 
 404. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A (West Supp. 2001). 
 405. Id. 
 406. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 691 N.E.2d 911, 917 (Mass. 1998). 
 407. Id. 
 408. Id. at 916. 
 409. 736 N.E.2d 449 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000). 
 410. Id. at 454. 
 411. Id. at 451. 
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obtained two protective orders against him, and the father faced 
pending assault charges, though it is unclear from the decision who 
the victim was.412  In spite of all this evidence of the father’s abuse, 
the trial court used a best interests analysis, barely mentioning the 
presumption statute.413  The appellate court affirmed the trial 
court’s order, dismissing the domestic violence issue in one short 
paragraph.414  It stated that the trial court had “considered the 
question of abuse and was of the opinion that the present case 
presented no history or pattern of domestic violence that would 
preclude an award of custody to the father.”415  The presumption 
against custody to batterers was mentioned only in passing, in a 
footnote.416  The case is troubling, as it raises the question as to 
what triggers the presumption.  If two protective orders, an assault 
conviction, and a pending assault charge are not “a history or 
pattern of domestic violence,” what is?417 
(6) Minnesota 
In 1990, Minnesota enacted its presumption statute, applicable 
only in joint custody cases.418  Since then, there have been only 
three appellate cases decided regarding domestic violence 
allegations in custody battles.419  Two of the three are unpublished 
and only one even mentions the presumption statute.  Thus, the 
statute appears not to have been particularly effective in ensuring 
 
 412. Id. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Id. at 456. 
 415. Id. 
 416. Id. at 456 n.12.  “The mother makes no argument that the father’s 
conduct constitutes a pattern or serious incident of abuse that would give rise to 
the rebuttable presumption contained in §10(e).” 
 417. Given the pre-presumption decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Court, 
in which the court held that it was reversible error not to make findings of fact on 
domestic violence in a custody case where domestic violence had been an issue, 
Custody of Vaughn, 664 N.E.2d 434, 440 (Mass. 1996), Zia appears actually to be a 
step backward. 
 418. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2000).  Loretta Frederick, a prominent domestic 
violence advocate and attorney in Minnesota, reported that there has been no 
backlash to the presumption statute because it is so weak.  Telephone 
Conversation Loretta Frederick, Attorney, with author (July 16, 2001). 
 419. See Schmid v. Schmid, No. C9-99-1080, 2000 WL 108785 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Feb. 1, 2000); Canning v. Wieckowski, No. C4-98-1638, 1999 WL 118509 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Mar. 9, 1999); Nazar v. Nazar, 505 N.W.2d 628 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (review 
denied, Oct. 28, 1993) (superseded by statute as stated in Papetti v. Papetti, No. 
C2-99-563, 2000 WL 31789 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2000)). 
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that domestic violence is given great weight by custody judges. 
In the first case, Nazar v. Nazar,420the trial court had awarded 
custody to the father where the mother had left the state with the 
children and defaulted in the divorce, having had no notice of it.421  
Though the appellate court did not mention the presumption 
against joint custody in domestic violence cases, it did reverse the 
trial court’s custody decision, based on a best interests analysis.422  It 
reasoned that at the foundation of the dissolution were the 
allegations that the father physically, emotionally and verbally 
abused the mother and children.  It stated that the trial court must 
seriously examine any allegations of child abuse before determining 
custody.423  The allegations of spousal abuse disappeared in this 
holding.  Since the trial court had not undergone a serious 
examination of any of the allegations, the appellate court 
reversed.424  The appellate court also disagreed with the trial court 
finding that the mother had “falsely” and “maliciously” alleged that 
the father had been violent in order to obtain emergency custody 
jurisdiction from another state.425 
In the second case, Canning v. Wieckowski,426 the appellate court 
affirmed the order granting custody of the child to the father in a 
case where both parties alleged abuse by the other.427  While the 
mother had been granted an order of protection, no findings of 
abuse were made at that time.428  The court appointed evaluator was 
of the opinion that the mother had fabricated the allegations of 
abuse, and the trial court found no substantial evidence that the 
alleged abuse had any effect on the child, relying on the evaluator’s 
report.429  The court also found that the father was the more 
friendly parent, and that the mother “demonized” the father.430  
The case does not mention the presumption, perhaps because joint 
custody was not being considered, and the Minnesota presumption 
 
 420. 505 N.W.2d at 628. 
 421. Id. at 638. 
 422. Id. at 633. 
 423. Id. (citing Uhl v. Uhl, 395 N.W.2d 106, 111 (Minn. App. Ct. 1986). 
 424. Id.. 
 425. Id. at 634. 
 426. No. C4-98-1638, 1999 WL 118509 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 1999). 
 427. Id. at *1. 
 428. Id. at *5. 
 429. Id. at *4.  The court stated that,”[h]ere, a thorough custody evaluation of 
both parties and the child was completed; the court had no need to investigate 
further.”  Id. at *4 n.5. 
 430. Id. at *5. 
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is not relevant when the court awards sole custody to either parent. 
The most recent case and the only one that mentions the 
presumption is Schmid v. Schmid.431  In this case, the trial court held 
that the presumption against joint custody was triggered by the 
mother’s evidence that there were numerous instances of physical 
and verbal abuse by the father, and by an order of protection 
ordering the father to leave the household.432  However, the trial 
court also found that the presumption was rebutted when the 
father produced evidence that the abuse occurred more than four 
years ago and had not been repeated.433  Then turning to a best 
interests analysis, the court awarded custody to the father.434  It 
reasoned that the abuse did not affect the parties’ ability to co-
parent, the children had developed a good relationship with the 
father, and the mother, if awarded sole physical custody, would 
restrict the father’s access to the children, which would not be in 
their best interest.435  The father, on the other hand, was found to 
be the more friendly parent.436  The court of appeals affirmed the 
trial court’s award of joint legal and physical custody.437  This case is 
illustrative of the need for specific factors that the court must 
consider in determining whether the presumption has been 
rebutted.  The Minnesota statute contains no such factors.438  In 
their absence, courts are free to create their own standards. 
(7) Case Study: An Unsuccessful Attempt to Pass Stronger 
Legislation 
While Minnesota’s statute does not seem to have much effect 
on the outcome of custody cases at present, it is not an easy matter 
to pass stronger legislation.  The experience of advocates during 
the 2001 legislative session is an interesting case in point. 
A retired Minnesota judge, Mary Louise Klas, stated that she 
has been intrigued for many years by the reluctance of the judiciary 
 
 431. No.C9-99-1080, 2000 WL 108785 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2000). 
 432. Id. at *1. 
 433. Id. at *2. 
 434. Id. 
 435. Id. at **1-2. 
 436. Id. at *2.  The court noted that father acknowledged the importance of 
the mother in the child’s like and that the mother did not reciprocate this 
importance of the father’s role.  Id. at *4. 
 437. Id. 
 438. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2000). 
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to recognize and understand domestic violence in custody cases.439  
Since this did not improve with the appointment of more women 
to the bench, her conclusion was that this was not an issue of the 
gender of the judges, but that other factors were the cause, 
including very busy calendars.440  She stated that family court 
calendars are a “cattle call,” and that judges are pressured to keep 
the cases moving, giving them no time to stop and question 
allegations of domestic violence, or to issue the statutorily 
mandated findings required under the best interests statute.441  She 
also mentioned that the attorneys are often not vigorously pursuing 
the arguments to make judges issue such findings.442  Furthermore, 
the Minnesota statute provides that joint custody is presumed to be 
in the best interests of the children except in domestic violence 
cases.443  Thus in cases where domestic violence has actually taken 
place but the court does not believe the allegations, joint custody is 
often awarded.444 
Even when the presumption is not applicable, Minnesota’s best 
interests statute requires judges to consider the effects of domestic 
violence on children.445  However, “this is consistently ignored” 
according to Cyndi Cook, the former Legislation and Public Policy 
Coordinator for the Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women.446  
Partly in response to this, in 2001, the Minnesota State Bar,447 in 
conjunction with the Coalition and the Domestic Violence 
Legislative Alliance, sponsored legislation that would have 
strengthened the state’s custody laws in domestic violence cases.448  
The first version would have extended the rebuttable presumption 
to sole custody cases, but was never introduced due to opposition 
 
 439. Telephone Conversation with Mary Louise Klas, retired judge (July 31, 
2001).  Judge Klas is part of a group of attorneys, advocates, and academics 
currently drafting Minnesota domestic violence custody legislation. 
 440. Id. 
 441. Id. 
 442. Id. 
 443. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (2)(d) (2000). 
 444. Klas Telephone Conversation, supra note 439. 
 445. MINN. STAT. § 518.17. 
 446. Telephone Conversation with Cyndi Cook, former Legislation and Public 
Policy Coordinator, Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women (July 30, 2001). 
 447. This sponsorship was the result of a domestic violence expert, Loretta 
Frederick, working closely with the State Bar Family Law Section for several years.  
Frederick Telephone Conversation, supra note 418. 
 448. Id.; E-mail from Cyndi Cook, former Legislation and Public Policy 
Coordinator, Minnesota Coalition for Battered Women to author, Professor of 
Law, University of California at  (Aug. 5, 2001) (on file with author). 
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from the Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.449  In addition, 
domestic violence advocates heard feedback from other 
jurisdictions that a presumption against sole custody to batterers 
was sometimes problematic, especially in cases where the batterer 
has an attorney and the victim does not.450  Thus, they decided they 
were not prepared to move forward with such language at that 
time.451 
The two companion bills as introduced, S.F. 1212452 and H.F. 
1256,453 provided that the court must document how any award of 
custody or visitation to a batterer best protects the safety and 
emotional well being of the child and of the other party.454  
Findings would be required whenever there were allegations of 
injury, use of a dangerous weapon, or a pattern of domestic 
abuse.455  Domestic abuse would be defined by the Domestic Abuse 
Act, which governs issuance of orders for protection.456  During 
legislative hearings, proponents of the bill stated that a “pattern of 
domestic abuse” meant two or more acts of domestic abuse, 
consistent with a Minnesota homicide statute.457  Thus, according to 
Ms. Cook, one threat of abuse, plus one incident in which the 
abuser interfered with the victim’s making a 911 call, could 
constitute a “pattern of domestic abuse,” triggering the 
requirement of findings.458 
This standard is higher than that required by the Domestic 
 
 449. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 447; Cook E-mail, supra note 
448. 
 450. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 447; Cook E-mail, supra note 
448. 
 451. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 447; Cook E-mail, supra note 
448. 
 452. S.F. 1212, 82nd Leg. (Minn. 2001). 
 453. H.F. 1256, 82nd Leg. (Minn. 2001). 
 454. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note 
448. 
 455. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note 
448. 
 456. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note 
448. 
 457. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446.  See MINN. STAT. § 
518B.01(2)(a) (2000) (defining domestic abuse as physical harm, bodily injury, or 
assault, infliction of fear of one of these, terroristic threats, criminal sexual 
conduct).  Since the statute does not require more than one of these, presumably 
one such act would suffice as grounds for a protective order. 
 458. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446.  This definition did not 
actually appear in the 2001 legislation, but may be included in the 2002 version.  
See id. § 518B.01(2)(a). 
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Abuse Act,459 which was a deliberate decision made by the 
proponents of the legislation.460  They were concerned about the 
significant numbers of victims of domestic violence who are 
arrested when they engage in self-defense or in non-legal 
violence.461  If the custody statute were triggered by an arrest for the 
use of legal violence, that is, self-defense, it could backfire against 
many victims of domestic violence.462  Their hope was that in setting 
the standard low for protective orders and higher for custody 
orders, this backlash could be minimized.463 
However, when the legislation was considered in the state 
Senate, conservative Senators insisted on adding a provision 
defining how the court would determine whether domestic abuse 
had occurred.464  This amendment required that there had to be 
corroboration of the abuse before the court would be required to 
make the findings.465  The corroboration was limited to one of the 
following: a prior court finding of domestic abuse, the issuance of 
an order for protection, a criminal conviction, or a police report in 
which the officer observed domestic abuse.466  At the request of the 
State Bar, the legislation was withdrawn, as they could no longer 
support it.467  Supporters of the legislation are meeting to 
determine what the legislation should look like in the next 
session.468 
The next version will probably include “predominant 
aggressor” language, giving the court guidance when there are 
allegations of abuse by both parties.469  However, this provision is 
 
 459. See id. § 518B.01(2)(a) (2001). 
 460. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446. 
 461. Id. 
 462. Id.; Cook Email, supra note 448. 
 463. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446.  Loretta Frederick, 
another proponent of the legislation, stated that the definition of domestic abuse 
in the next version of the bill may be even more narrow, that is physical abuse 
alone, in order to minimize problems with backlash and inclusion of victims.  
Frederick Telephone Conversation, supra note 418. 
 464. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note 
448. 
 465. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note 
448. 
 466. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note 
448. 
 467. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note 
448. 
 468. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note 
448. 
 469. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446.  Minnesota does not have 
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controversial even among proponents of the legislation.  Loretta 
Frederick, a prominent domestic violence advocate from 
Minnesota, is of the opinion that this language should not be 
included in a presumption statute, as this would trigger a full trial 
on that issue in every case, given the prevalence of batterers 
asserting that they are actually the victims.470 
The next domestic violence custody bill in Minnesota may also 
address the role of guardians ad litem and child custody evaluators.  
This is an issue for two reasons.  First, many judges give great 
weight, some would say undue weight, to the recommendations of 
these professionals.471  Additionally, guardians ad litem in 
Minnesota are sometimes able to cause the parties to change their 
custody and visitation agreements, which in at least one case has 
had fatal results.472 
During the pendency of the 2001 bill, several members of the 
legislature, as well as the matrimonial lawyers association, stated 
repeatedly that what a man does to his wife bears no relationship to 
his parenting.473  This viewpoint is, of course, what stands in the way 
of rebuttable presumption legislation or even legislation mandating 
that judges consider domestic violence in custody cases being 
passed and implemented around the country.  In spite of this 
hurdle, it seems likely that eventually the Minnesota legislature will 
enact a stronger statute governing custody decisions in which 
domestic violence has occurred. 
 
this type of language in its criminal statutes, thus, it would be a new concept for 
the entire state.  Id.  Ms. Cook also stated that during legislative hearings, 
proponents of the legislation argued that if there were allegations that both 
parties were abusive, it was imperative for courts to make findings, rather than 
ruling that the presumption was inapplicable.  Id. 
 470. Frederick Telephone Conversation, supra note 418. 
 471. Id.  Ms. Cook also stated that the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Gender 
Fairness in the Courts Task Force is currently examining the role of guardians ad 
litem, so this may be another way to redefine this role, require training on 
domestic violence.  Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446. 
 472. In one recent case described by Cook, the father convinced the guardian 
ad litem that he no longer required supervision during the visitation.  Cook 
Telephone Conversation, supra note 446; Cook E-mail, supra note 448.  When he 
refused to return the child, and the mother came to the father’s house to get the 
child, the father killed the mother.  Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 
446; Cook E-mail, supra note 448. 
 473. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 448. 
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(8) Nevada 
Nevada adopted its presumption statutes on October 1, 
1995.474  Since then there have been four appellate cases 
interpreting it.475  Overall, it appears that this statute has made a 
significant difference in how allegations of domestic violence are 
treated in custody decisions.  However, it also appears that it is 
necessary to appeal the decisions in which the statute was ignored 
or given little weight, as in every appellate case so far, the trial court 
order was reversed and remanded.476 
In Lesley v. Lesley,477 the first Nevada appellate case on point, 
the husband was initially awarded custody because the wife 
defaulted in the divorce.478  She had fled the state with the children 
and obtained temporary custody and a restraining order in the new 
state.479  She and witnesses later testified that there were several 
occasions on which the husband had struck her, leaving bruises.480  
However, the Nevada trial court found that this was not a 
meritorius defense and refused to set the decree aside.481  The 
Nevada Supreme Court reversed, citing the presumption statute, 
and citing the public policy of ensuring that children were not 
placed with an abusive parent.482 
In McDermott v. McDermott,483 the initial degree ordered joint 
legal custody and gave the wife primary physical custody.484  The 
husband’s motion to modify this in his favor was granted by the 
trial court, in spite of the fact that the husband had recently been 
convicted of assaulting the wife when she came to pick up the 
 
 474. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 125.480 (Michie Supp. 1999). 
 475. Hayes v. Gallacher, 972 P.2d 1138 (Nev. 1999); Russo v. Gardner, 956 
P.2d 98 (Nev. 1998); McDermott v. McDermott, 946 P.2d 177 (Nev. 1997); Lesley 
v. Lesley, 941 P.2d 451 (Nev. 1997), overruled by Epstein v. Epstein, 950 P.2d 771 
(Nev. 1997). 
 476. Nevada has no intermediate appellate court; thus all appellate cases are 
decided by the state supreme court. 
 477. 941 P.2d 451. 
 478. Id. at 452. 
 479. Id. 
 480. Id. at 453. 
 481. Id. 
 482. Id. at 455-56.  The Lesley case was overruled in Epstein v. Epstein on other 
grounds. 950 P.2d 771 (Nev. 1997).  Epstein held that the respondent does not 
need to show a meritorius defense in order to set aside a default judgment of 
divorce.  Id. at 773. 
 483. 946 P.2d 177 (Nev. 1997). 
 484. Id. at 178. 
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child.485  The trial court stated that it “understands the provocation 
which might have existed,” suggested that the husband go to 
domestic violence classes, and threatened to order this unless he 
went voluntarily.486  It did not mention the presumption statute. 
This modification was reversed by the Supreme Court, holding that 
the trial court was required to consider the rebuttable 
presumption, which was triggered by the husband’s conviction.487  
The dissent argued that since the presumption was not raised at the 
trial court level, it could not be the basis for reversal, and that the 
trial court’s decision appeared appropriate.488 
In Russo v. Gardner,489 there was evidence that the father had 
abused the mother and two children, one of whom was not his.490  
He had been convicted of abusing the mother, and there was a 
police report regarding his abuse of the woman who brought the 
children for visitation.491  In spite of this abuse, the trial court found 
that the mother’s testimony was motivated by animus toward the 
father, and that the father had equitably adopted the child who was 
not his.492  It granted the parents joint legal custody of both 
children, with primary physical custody to the mother.493  The state 
supreme court reversed the joint custody award, citing the 
presumption statute, which had been triggered and not rebutted, 
and noting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award custody 
of the non-biological child to the father.494 
In the most recent Nevada case, Hayes v. Gallacher,495 the initial 
award was also joint legal custody, with primary physical custody to 
 
 485. Id. 
 486. Id. at 179. 
 487. Id. 
 488. Id. (Springer, J., dissenting).  Contrast the holding in McDermott with that 
in Ward v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), in which the mother’s 
failure to raise the statutory presumption in the trial court was held to preclude 
consideration of the statute by the appellate court.  Id.  See also supra note 355 and 
accompanying text (explaining the Ward case). 
 489. 956 P.2d 98 (Nev. 1998). 
 490. Id. at 99. 
 491. Id. 
 492. Id. at 100. 
 493. Id. 
 494. Id. at 103.  A factually very similar case is found in Barkaloff v. Woodward, 
47 Cal. App. 4th 393 (Ca. Ct. App. 1996).  In Barkaloff, a batterer boyfriend was 
granted visitation of his ex-partner’s child by the trial court.  Id. at 397.  This was 
reversed by the appellate court due to lack of jurisdiction.  Id. at 399. 
 495. 972 P.2d 1138 (Nev. 1999). 
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the mother.496  The mother had obtained a one year restraining 
order against the father based on his abuse of her, and the judge 
had made a finding that time that domestic violence occurred.497  
Later, the mother sought permission to relocate with her new 
husband and the children to Japan, where the new husband had 
been transferred by the Air Force.498  Without an evidentiary 
hearing and also apparently without considering the presumption, 
a different judge ordered that custody be transferred from the 
mother to the father if the mother moved.499  The state supreme 
court reversed and remanded, ordering the trial court to 
reexamine the custody arrangement in light of the presumption 
statute, since the presumption had been raised by the earlier 
finding of domestic violence and had not been rebutted.500 
(9) Oklahoma 
Oklahoma adopted the rebuttable presumption against 
custody to batterers in 1991.501  So far there are only two cases on 
point, with contrary holdings: Brown v. Brown502 and Smith v. 
Smith.503 
In Brown, the issue was what triggers the presumption.504  The 
trial court awarded custody to the father.505  There was evidence 
that the father had shoved the mother, threatened her with 
violence, and broken out the windows in the car of a man who the 
father believed was having an affair with the mother.506  The father 
had also acted similarly on other occasions with third parties.507  
The trial court quoted the criminal definition of domestic abuse 
(physical harm or threat of imminent physical harm), and noted 
that the abuse in this case appeared to be “one or two isolated 
instances of prescribed behavior.”508  The trial court found that this 
behavior did not constitute “ongoing domestic abuse” so as to 
 
 496. Id. at 1139. 
 497. Id. at 1141. 
 498. Id. at 1139. 
 499. Id. at 1141. 
 500. Id. at 1142. 
 501. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112.2 (West 2001). 
 502. 867 P.2d 477 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993). 
 503. 963 P.2d 24 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998). 
 504. 867 P.2d at 477. 
 505. Id. 
 506. Id. at 479. 
 507. Id. 
 508. Id. at 480. 
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trigger the presumption.509  It also appeared to disapprove of the 
mother, mentioning that she had propositioned one of the father’s 
co-workers and stating that she was evasive and dissembling.510  The 
appellate court upheld the trial court order.511 
In Smith, the father was also awarded custody by the trial 
court.512  However, in this case the court of appeals reversed and 
remanded, holding that there was clear and convincing evidence of 
ongoing domestic abuse by the father, triggering the 
presumption.513  The evidence of abuse included the wife’s 
restraining order declaration, in which she alleged that the 
husband had physically and verbally abused her, threatened to kill 
her, and threatened to kill himself, all in the presence of the 
child.514  There were also several witnesses who testified regarding 
the father’s abuse of the mother and child.515  The Smith court held 
that the evidence met the test that the abuse be frequent and 
recent, and also held that the father had not rebutted the 
presumption.516 
c.  Jurisdictions Where the Presumption is Very New 
As we have seen above, implementation of presumption 
statutes is often uneven.  However, in some states these statutes 
have actually resulted in a backlash towards victims of domestic 
violence, as will be described in this section. 
In the jurisdictions where the presumption against custody to 
batterers is very new, there is not yet any appellate law on point.  
However, there are anecdotal accounts of how the law is working 
and a survey conducted by four law students in one state.  Based on 
the history in other jurisdictions where the presumption has been 
in effect for several years, it appears that it may be necessary to ask 
the appellate courts to intervene before the procedure in the trial 
courts actually changes. 
 
 509. Id. at 479-80. 
 510. Id. at 479. 
 511. Id. 
 512. 963 P.2d 24, 25 (Okla. Ct. App. 1998). 
 513. Id. at 26. 
 514. Id. at 25. 
 515. Id. 
 516. Id. at 26. 
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(1) Arizona 
Arizona adopted the presumption effective January 2001.517  A 
lawyer with the Arizona Coalition Against Domestic Violence 
reported that the legal committee of the Coalition discussed how 
the presumption was working six months later, on June 21, 2001.518  
Their conclusion was that things have worsened since the 
enactment of the statute.519  This attorney stated that there is a 
strong preference for joint custody on the part of the judiciary, and 
that sole custody is awarded almost exclusively in default cases.520  
She estimated that the local legal advocacy center receives about six 
calls each week in which battered mothers are complaining that 
judges are refusing to hear evidence of domestic violence, in spite 
of the new statute.521  For example, one judge looked at photos 
taken by the police and acknowledged that the violence had been 
significant, but then stated that because there was no evidence of a 
history of violence, the judge would not give any weight to it.522 
The Arizona statute is internally inconsistent: when it discusses 
domestic violence as relevant to joint custody, it requires either 
“significant domestic violence” or “a significant history of domestic 
violence.”523  On the other hand, when it discusses custody 
generally, it requires only “an act of domestic violence against the 
other parent,” defined as intentionally causing or attempting to 
cause sexual assault or serious physical injury, or apprehension 
thereof, or engaging in a pattern of behavior which would qualify 
for a protective order.524  This inconsistency is inherently confusing; 
it is hoped that the legislature will amend the statute so that it is 
consistent. 
While this lawyer said she suspected that the statute might be 
helping battered parents at the settlement stage, she had no actual 
proof of this.525  She also stated that Arizona has had a statute since 
1986 stating that domestic violence is detrimental to children, but 
 
 517. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. §25-403(N) (2000). 
 518. E-mail from Dianne Post, Attorney, Arizona Coalition Against Domestic 
Violence, to author, Professor of Law, University of California at  (June 26, 2001) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Post E-mail (1)]. 
 519. Id. 
 520. Id. 
 521. Id. 
 522. Id. 
 523. See ARIZ REV. STAT. § 25-403(E) (2000). 
 524. See id. § 25-403(N). 
 525. Post E-mail, supra note 518. 
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that it did not seem to make a difference, so it was predictable that 
the new statute might have the same lack of effect.526 
(2) Oregon 
Oregon adopted the presumption effective in 2000.527  Lawyers 
specializing in domestic violence family law cases give mixed 
reports at this point.  An attorney working for the Oregon 
Coalition Against Domestic and Sexual Violence reported that 
some unethical attorneys now send their clients to get restraining 
orders regardless of whether there has been any history of domestic 
violence in order to bolster the custody case.528  She commented 
that such orders are fairly easy to obtain in Oregon.529  She also 
stated that the new statute does not seem to be keeping batterers 
from getting custody, probably because the batterers “tend to look 
better on paper.”530  She opined that the presumption is fairly easily 
rebutted: in cases where the father has a home and job, and does 
not suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder or chemical 
dependencies, judges are finding that these factors rebut the 
presumption.531  She concluded that the new statute has not been 
very helpful, other than philosophically.532 
A staff attorney from Oregon Legal Aid reports that in one 
county, the new statute has resulted in a backlash in terms of the 
issuance of restraining orders. 533  Characterizing this as a “huge 
 
 526. E-mail from Dianne Post, attorney for Arizona Coalition Against Domestic 
Violence to author (July 3, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Post Email 2].  
This is apparently referring to Arizona Statute section 25-403(M). ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
§ 25-403(M) (2000). 
 527. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(2) (2000). 
 528. E-mail from Katy Yetter, Attorney, Oregon Coalition Against Domestic 
and Sexual Violence, to author, Professor of Law, University of California at  (June 
18, 2001) (on file with author). 
 529. Id. 
 530. Id.  This appears to be a reference to fact that there are no restraining 
order hearings in Oregon unless the respondent requests a hearing.  See OR. REV. 
STAT. § 107.718 (1999).  This was also mentioned by Maureen McKnight, the 
Regional Director for Oregon Legal Aid, who said that the fact that restraining 
orders are so often issued ex parte means that many judges feel that a finding of 
abuse in a restraining order has no effect in a subsequent family law proceeding.  
E-mail from Ms. McKnight, Regional Direction for Oregon Legal Aid, to author, 
Professor of Law, University of California at  (June 18, 2001) (on file with author). 
 531. Id. 
 532. Id. 
 533. E-mail from Caitlin Glass, Attorney, Oregon Legal Aid, to author, 
Professor of Law, University of California at  (June 16, 2001) (on file with author).  
Ms. Glass summarized comments made to her from Legal Aid attorneys in several 
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problem” in that county, she stated that judges are continuing 
orders without making findings, ordering joint custody prior to any 
hearing or trial, or setting up parenting plans without making 
custody orders.534  In other counties, however, there does not seem 
to be this backlash, though it may be harder to get a restraining 
order now if the respondent is represented.535  Legal Aid attorneys 
are also seeing more abusers filing for restraining orders in hopes 
of receiving the benefit of the new statute.536  In terms of orders 
issued in dissolution and custody cases, she reported that in some 
counties, judges are reluctant to apply the new presumption.537 
Another Oregon attorney stated that the presumption works 
well in her county when custody is being decided in a restraining 
order hearing.538  She also stated that these judges accepted the 
issuance of a restraining order as preclusive on the issue of whether 
the presumption had been raised.539  However, she stated that when 
this issue is being decided at a custody trial, judges will easily find 
that the presumption has been rebutted if the judge wants to award 
custody to the abuser.540  She said the practice is often to hear all 
the evidence, but then to make the decision based on the 
traditional best interest factors, finding that these factors rebut the 
presumption.541  This attorney has argued that the new statute 
means the court must treat domestic violence as the most 
important and primary factor before looking at traditional factors, 
and that the abuser must rebut the presumption by engaging in 
batterers’ treatment or otherwise demonstrating that the abuse will 
not impact the child.542  However, as of yet, no judge has accepted 
this argument.543  She concluded that she would like to see a higher 
court interpret the new statute so that the trial courts have 
guidance on how it is rebutted.544 
 
counties.  Id. 
 534. Id. 
 535. Id. 
 536. Id. 
 537. Id. 
 538. E-mail correspondence from Jud Carusone, Oregon attorney, to author, 
Professor of Law, University of California at  (June 13, 2001) (on file with author). 
 539. Id. 
 540. Id. 
 541. Id. 
 542. Id. 
 543. Id. 
 544. Id. 
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(3) California 
In March and April of 2001, a telephone survey was conducted 
by four students at Boalt Hall School of Law, UC Berkeley, on how 
California’s rebuttable presumption statute, Family Code section 
3044, was working.545  This statute became effective January 1, 2000.  
The students interviewed twenty-four people from nine counties 
throughout the state, including attorneys, judicial officers, 
legislative aides, custody evaluators, survivors of domestic violence, 
domestic violence experts, and community resource people.546  The 
overall conclusions of the students were that the statute’s passage 
“is a rather hollow victory for social justice,”547 but also that the new 
code section is “a positive addition with significant potential.”548 
The students found that there were major problems with 
section 3044 of the California Family Code, consisting of 
“inconsistent and often distorted implementation.”549  The 
problems fell into four categories.550 First, there were polarized 
positions with regard to the purpose of the code section.551  These 
took the form of disagreement as to whether domestic violence is 
relevant to the custody decision.552  For many years, California has 
required that judges consider any past domestic violence in every 
custody decision.553  Respondents also disagreed with the provision 
in the statute that domestic violence is relevant to legal custody as 
well as physical custody orders.554  Finally, some respondents felt 
that judges already adequately considered the occurrence and 
effect of domestic violence without a statutory directive.555  Notably, 
an earlier survey conducted by the California Alliance Against 
Domestic Violence in 1998 found that many judges did not take 
domestic violence into account in custody decisions, thus ignoring 
both prior pieces of legislation on this topic.556  This lack of judicial 
 
 545. Debbie Warren et al., California Family Code § 3044: Passage, 
Implementation and Effects 22-23 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author). 
 546. Id. at 22. 
 547. Id. at 23. 
 548. Id. at 22. 
 549. Id. at 23. 
 550. Id. 
 551. Id. 
 552. Id. at 23-26. 
 553. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 2000). 
 554. Warren et al., supra note 545, at 23-24. 
 555. Id. at 24-25. 
 556. Id. at 13.  The unpublished C.A.A.D.V. survey results are on file with the 
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response to the prior legislation was one of the reasons cited to the 
legislature in arguing for the enactment of a rebuttable 
presumption.557 
The second problem the students found was that many 
respondents saw the statutory language as ambiguous.558  Even 
though the California statute is much more specific than many 
other presumption statutes, some respondents stated that they 
thought the statute should more clearly define what type of finding 
was necessary in order to trigger the presumption.559  Additionally, 
though the statute contains a list of factors which the court must 
consider in determining whether the presumption has been 
overcome, as discussed in Part III, some respondents felt that this 
section of the statute was still too vague and should provide more 
direction to the court (for example, what if the batterer has 
complied with one or two of the factors but not with the others?).560  
This request from the judiciary for more specific legislative 
directives is ironic, considering that the legislation was opposed by 
the California Judges’ Association, who argued that the discretion 
of family law judges in making custody decisions should not be 
further limited.561 
Third, the survey found that some judges were not resistant to 
the presumption and appeared to have adequate resources, 
including enough time on court calendars to hold a timely 
evidentiary hearing as to whether domestic violence had 
occurred.562  These judges had either always given domestic 
violence great weight in making custody decisions, or had recently 
changed their court practices and procedures to give this issue 
 
author.  One of the prior pieces of legislation was A.B. 200.  See infra Part III (H). 
 557. See Devers, supra note 99, at 3-5.  “Providers of services to domestic 
violence victims from 12 counties, ranging from Shasta to San Bernardino, 
responded to the [C.A.A.D.V.] survey.  The result was unanimous that AB 200 is 
virtually ignored except in those courts that were already dealing effectively with 
domestic violence prior to its passage.  One response from Santa Cruz County was 
particularly telling: ‘I have never heard a judge here make a specific finding as 
mandated by AB 200, and one, when prompted, said he didn’t have to - that was 
his order.’”  Id. at 5. 
 558. Warren et al., supra note 545, at 23. 
 559. Id. at 26-27.  The California presumption is triggered by the same low 
level of abuse required to qualify for a restraining order.  Section 3044 of the 
California family code cross references section 6320 of the Domestic Violence 
Prevention Act in defining domestic violence. 
 560. Id. at 24-27. 
 561. See Devers, supra note 98, at 7-8. 
 562. Warren et al., supra note 545, at 29, 33-34. 
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greater weight.563 
However, the survey also found that there was substantial 
judicial resistance in several counties, due in part to lack of such 
resources.564  Some judges opined that joint custody was almost 
always appropriate, even in domestic violence cases.565  Judicial 
officers also stated that they resented statutorily imposed 
restrictions on their discretion.566  Examples of such resistance on 
the part of judges took the form of ordering the litigants to 
repeatedly try to mediate the dispute in hopes that they would 
eventually come to an agreement.567  Additional examples of 
resistance included awarding joint custody in spite of police reports 
or even prior convictions for domestic violence.568 
The lack of judicial resources is a very real problem in many 
areas.  Many judges have severe time constraints on their calendars, 
making the presumption yet another hurdle which they have to 
surmount.569  In these courts, judges are faced with a dilemma 
regarding how to structure temporary custody and visitation, given 
that it may be months before the calendar is free for an actual 
evidentiary hearing, so the temporary order is usually based only on 
allegations.570 
Finally, the students found that there had been an adverse 
impact on the issuance of restraining orders in several California 
counties.571  In these areas, it has become increasingly difficult to 
obtain orders; judges are now requiring independent 
corroboration of the abuse in many cases,572 and of course many 
victims have no such corroboration.  This appears to be happening 
because judges are leery of triggering the presumption through the 
issuance of a restraining order.  However, it is unclear whether the 
mere issuance of an order is in fact a finding triggering the 
presumption.  In response to this concern, some judges are 
encouraging or requiring the parties to stipulate to the order, 
which thereby avoids a court finding of abuse.573  Other judges are 
 
 563. Id. at 33-34. 
 564. Id. at 29-33. 
 565. Id. at 29-30. 
 566. Id. at 29. 
 567. Id. at 33. 
 568. Id. 
 569. Id. at 30. 
 570. Id. at 29. 
 571. Id. at 34-37. 
 572. Id. at 35. 
 573. Id. at 31-32. 
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issuing restraining orders but stating on the record that they are 
making no finding of domestic violence.574  (Query whether such 
orders would be upheld on appeal, since there appears to be no 
basis for the order, and thus no subject matter jurisdiction.)  Still 
other judges are continuing temporary orders several times rather 
than issuing a long-term order after hearing, again hoping to avoid 
the triggering of the presumption.575 
The backlash in court response to restraining order requests 
has been great in some parts of the state.  Some victims have been 
discouraged from even seeking judicial remedies for domestic 
violence.576  If the victim does seek such help, she is often forced to 
go to court several times, which may have serious consequences in 
terms of her employment,577 as well as forcing her to confront the 
batterer repeatedly.  And ironically, the more times the court 
requires the victim to return to court, the more court time is spent 
on the case, arguably wasting this precious resource, which perhaps 
could be better spent holding an evidentiary hearing. 
The survey concludes with several recommendations.  These 
include greater and more consistent implementation of the 
statute,578 clarification from the legislature or the appellate courts 
as to what constitutes a “finding” of domestic violence,579 
eliminating the negative effects on issuance of restraining orders,580 
and increased resources for family courts.581  The survey also 
recommended educating judges regarding the fact that the 
presumption is rebuttable,582 educating attorneys regarding how to 
advocate for this new law and how to work with courts on changing 
existing practices,583 and educating the public as to the relevance of 
domestic violence to custody decisions, given that many litigants 
have no attorneys.584 
 
 574. Id. at 32. 
 575. Id. at 33, 36-37. 
 576. Id. at 37. 
 577. While the California Labor Code section 230 protects victims of domestic 
violence who take time off to go to court, many victims do not know about these 
provisions or how to access legal help to enforce them.  CAL. LABOR CODE §230 
(West 2000). 
 578. Warren et al., supra note 545, at 38. 
 579. Id. at 40-43. 
 580. Id. at 38. 
 581. Id. at 47-48. 
 582. Id. at 44-45. 
 583. Id. at 47. 
 584. Id. at 51.  One way to educate the public is through each state’s Judicial 
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The survey also recommended the alteration of pre-existing 
roles in family court,585 along with educating mediators working for 
Family Court Services regarding how to address domestic violence 
cases generally and the use of this new statute in particular.586  One 
of the challenges which will need to be resolved in implementing 
this new law in California will be how mediators working for Family 
Court Services will deal with domestic violence cases.  California 
mandates mediation of all disputed custody or visitation cases.587  
While victims of domestic violence may bring a support person to 
the mediation session,588 or request a meeting separate from the 
perpetrator,589 they are not exempted from the mediation process.  
Given that mediators do not usually engage in fact-finding, but that 
in many counties they make recommendations to the court, their 
procedures may need to be changed, so that they actually 
investigate allegations of abuse and then apprise the court of their 
findings.590 
Some California attorneys routinely appear in front of the 
same judges every week, representing or assisting numerous of 
clients from the local restraining order clinics.  Several of these 
attorneys have expressed an unwillingness to “rock the boat” by 
insisting that the judges comply with the new domestic violence 
custody statutes.591  They state that they are concerned that if they 
advocate too stridently on behalf of one client, the judge will 
retaliate against all the other clients coming from that same 
agency.592 
Additionally, judges presiding over these dockets are aware 
 
Council website.  See, e.g., Online Self Help Center, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/ 
selfhelp (launched by the California Judicial Council).  This site includes 
information about custody cases and domestic violence issues.  Id. 
 585. Warren et al., supra note 545, at 48-50. 
 586. Id. at 45-46. 
 587. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3160 (West 2001). 
 588. Id. § 6303 (West 2000). 
 589. Id. § 3181 (West 2000). 
 590. A proposed California Rule of Court, R1257.2, includes changing the job 
description of court-based mediators to include investigation of allegations of 
abuse.  If adopted, this will become effective Jan. 1, 2002. 
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/invitationstocomment/prevprop.htm (scroll down 
to SPR01-22). 
 591. Conversations between author and anonymous attorneys from the San 
Francisco Bay Area on various occasions in spring 2001. 
 592. Author’s discussions with anonymous attorneys from non-profit agencies 
working exclusively with victims of domestic violence and practicing in the San 
Francisco Bay Area, spring and summer 2001. 
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that the likelihood that a litigant will appeal one of their decisions 
is highly unlikely.  This is due in part to the high incidence of 
parties who represent themselves, in part to the high cost of an 
appeal, and in part to the reluctance of attorneys to anger the 
judge by appealing judgments.  Thus, they are not actually required 
to follow the statutory mandates, such as making a formal finding 
when ordering joint custody in a case where there are allegations of 
domestic violence.593 
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTATION 
A.  Introduction 
In a 1995 article examining the effectiveness of the 
presumption statutes in effect in eight jurisdictions at that time, the 
authors came to the following conclusions:594  1) The private bar is 
remarkably uninformed about domestic violence, and the quality of 
representation afforded victims by the bar is uneven.  2) Legal 
Services attorneys are relatively well informed about domestic 
violence.  3) Few jurisdictions have court systems that are “user-
friendly” to Pro Se custody litigants.  4) The judiciary is largely 
uninformed about domestic violence and judicial practice is 
inconsistent.  5) Specialized court services related to domestic 
violence custody cases are sorely wanting.  6) Domestic violence 
custody cases are not mandated to mediation in most presumption 
states.  7) Evaluators and guardians ad litem utilized by the courts 
have minimal specialized training on domestic violence.  8) The 
award of a protection order to an abused parent in most 
presumption states is not dispositive of the claim of domestic 
violence in custody proceedings.  9) The lack of secure supervised 
visitation facilities jeopardizes the protective mandates in state 
codes. 
Additionally, these commentators found that it is not yet clear 
that the domestic violence presumptions have effected ameliorative 
and protective outcomes for children and abused parents.595  In 
discussing this, the authors noted that while “[e]vidence of 
domestic violence is more . . . readily admitted in custody 
proceedings now than before statutory reform made domestic 
 
 593. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3011, 3020, & 3044 (West Supp. 2001). 
 594. Family Violence Project, supra note 18, at 211-222. 
 595. Id. 
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violence relevant,” resulting in a practice of generally awarding sole 
physical custody to victims, courts still were not safeguarding 
women and children from further abuse.596  Furthermore, they 
noted that the statutes were sometimes being used against women 
who defended themselves or their children.597  In most 
presumption states, however, this was not a serious problem 
because the standard for triggering the presumption was high 
enough that the victims’ actions were not found to have raised it.598 
What can we learn from all these comments, cases, and 
surveys?  How do we ensure that domestic violence is given the 
weight it deserves in custody disputes without creating even more 
problems for victims of abuse?  These are complex questions, 
without easy solutions. Additionally, the solutions may need to vary 
depending on which state and local community are involved.  
However, some conclusions can be drawn from this inquiry, and 
some recommendations made. 
B.  Statutory Language 
First, statutes of this kind should be carefully worded, giving a 
clear definition of what type of abuse is needed in order to trigger 
the presumption against custody to a batterer.  Additionally, the 
statute should clarify what standard of proof, and possibly what type 
of evidence is necessary in order to raise the presumption.  For 
example, does issuance of a restraining order after a hearing 
automatically trigger the presumption or not? 599 
In making this determination, legislatures might consider 
adopting a higher standard of abuse than is used for restraining or 
protective orders, as this may minimize judicial reluctance to issue 
such orders.600  In deciding how domestic violence should be 
 
 596. Id. at 221.  This is presumably a reference to visitation provisions, a source 
of great and ongoing danger in many post-divorce families. 
 597. Id. 
 598. Id. 
 599. See W. Kathleen Baker, Rebuttable Presumptions, 2 SYNERGY 2 (published by 
Nat. Council of Juv. & Fam. Ct. Judges) (Winter/Spring 1997) and Pincolini, supra 
note 56, at 8. 
 600. For example, the Massachusetts presumption statutes, MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN chs. 208 § 31A, 209 § 38, and 209C § 10 (West Supp. 2001), incorporate a 
higher standard than is used in the protective order statute, 209A.  The former 
requires “a pattern or serious incident of abuse,” while the latter requires only 
“one or more of the following acts,” and includes threats and attempted physical 
harm as well as actual physical harm or involuntary sexual relations. 
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defined in the presumption statute, legislatures must decide 
whether to include physical abuse only, or also threats of physical 
abuse and destruction of property.  It is also possible to include the 
infliction of emotional abuse as part of the definition of domestic 
violence.601  Of course, if emotional abuse is included, it is advisable 
to define this term for purposes of the statute, to prevent a finding 
that occasional verbal arguments or infrequent insults were 
sufficient to trigger the presumption.  Note that there is a split 
among domestic violence experts regarding the inclusion of threats 
or emotional abuse in presumption statutes.  In some cases, statutes 
were deliberately very narrowly drawn, in order to prevent a 
backlash against victims of domestic violence, who may have at 
times made statements which could be interpreted as threats or as 
emotional abuse.602 
It is also advisable to define abuse for triggering the 
presumption to include abuse against current or former partners, 
not just abuse against the co-parent who is contesting the custody 
of the child.603 
Statutes such as Minnesota’s allowing either parent to trigger a 
presumption favoring joint custody merely by requesting this 
should be amended to clarify that the domestic violence 
presumption trumps any joint custody presumption.604 
Furthermore, the statute should establish a clear procedure 
and standard of evidence for rebuttal of the presumption, with 
enumerated factors that the court must consider.  This helps 
prevent the court from simply making a conclusory statement that 
the batterer’s testimony showed that it was in the best interests of 
the child to be with him or her, as was the situation in several of the 
cases discussed above. 
An additional recommendation is that the custody statute 
contain a provision requiring judges to make written findings 
regarding whether domestic violence has taken place, why custody 
or visitation with the abuser has been ordered, and how the 
 
 601. Pincolini, supra note 56, at 8. 
 602. Family Violence Project, supra note 18. 
 603. See, e.g., Anderson v. Hensrud, 548 N.W.2d 410, 414 (N.D. 1996) (holding 
that the presumption could be raised by abuse of other victims besides the co-
parent). 
 604. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 30-3-131, 30-3-133 (1975), as discussed in Jackson v. 
Jackson, 709 So. 2d 46, 48 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (holding that the joint custody 
preference is trumped by the rebuttable presumption against custody to 
batterers). 
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children and adult victim will be protected by the order.  This 
could be triggered by any allegations of abuse,605 or by a judicial 
finding that abuse had occurred.  This can both encourage judges 
to think carefully about any orders they make and lay a foundation 
for appellate review. 
Statutes establishing rebuttable presumptions against custody 
to batterers should apply to all types of custody, sole or joint, legal 
or physical.  These statutes need to specifically address the issue of 
contact between the children and the abusive parent, clarifying that 
the safety of everyone involved is the “bottom line.”  In many states, 
visitation statutes addressing domestic violence situations are 
already in place.606  In states without such provisions, the 
presumption statute should be amended to include language 
concerning visitation, or a companion statute should be enacted 
covering the issue of visitation in domestic violence cases. 
Statutes should also provide that if the presumption is found 
not to apply (either because it was not raised, or because it was 
rebutted), domestic violence is still a factor that courts must 
consider when making any custody award.607  Statutes such as this 
will help ensure that the victim of domestic violence or the 
children’s attorney is not starting from scratch, having to prove to 
the court that domestic abuse is relevant to the custody decision 
even when that abuse has not been sufficient to trigger the 
statutory presumption. 
Statutes should also incorporate a dominant aggressor analysis, 
for the court to apply in cases where there are allegations of mutual 
abuse.608  This analysis should be specifically described, listing the 
factors for the court to consider in making its determination, and 
clarifying that the issue is not “who started the fight,” but the 
history of violence between the parties, whether one party was 
injured more severely, and whether there is any evidence of self-
defense.609 
 
 605. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West Supp. 2001) (containing such a 
requirement). 
 606. See, e.g., id.  § 3100. 
 607. See, e.g., id. § 3011 (continuing to apply even if the presumption statute, 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3044, does not). 
 608. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:364 (West 2000).  This may be called a 
“primary aggressor” or “predominant aggressor” determination, as well as 
“dominant aggressor.” 
 609. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 836 (West 2000).  However, as noted 
previously, at least one prominent domestic violence advocate is of the opinion 
that such a provision is not useful in a statute establishing a presumption against 
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C.  Training 
While the actual statutory provisions are important, the mere 
passage of the most well-written and comprehensive statute will not 
automatically solve the problems presented by cases in which 
domestic violence is an issue.  One of the key aspects of 
implementing any statute is training for everyone involved.  
Participants in a 1995 survey on the effectiveness of the 
presumption statutes reported that “in those judicial districts and 
states where there has been specialized training of the bar, the 
‘presumption’ has shaped judicial decision-making and has 
produced custody awards designed to safeguard children and 
abused parents.  In fact, the anticipated changes in practice have 
been most noticeable in those jurisdictions where the courts and 
legal services programs developed specialized programs.”610  
Training needs to be provided for judges,611 mediators,612 custody 
evaluators,613 family law attorneys,614 and guardians ad litem.615  The 
training needs to be very specific, addressing the studies leading to 
the passage of the state’s presumption statute, the legislative intent 
 
custody to batterers, since its inclusion may trigger many more trials on the 
“primary” or “dominant” aggressor issue.  Fredrick Telephone Conversation, supra 
note 418. 
 610. Family Violence Project, supra note 18, at 221-22. 
 611. In 1997, Minnesota passed a law mandating judicial education in the area 
of domestic violence and child custody.  MINN. STAT. § 480.30 (2000).  However, 
while such training is offered at the annual state judicial conference, judges are 
not actually required to attend.  Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446.  
Such statutes are very rare, and are often opposed by judicial associations on the 
grounds that they violate the separation of powers doctrine.  The Oregon 
Coalition Against Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault is offering statewide 
judicial training, focusing on the theme that one cannot be a batterer and a good 
parent at the same time.  E-mail from Katy Yetter to author (June 19, 2001) (on 
file with author). 
 612. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1815, 1816, 3110.5 (West 2000). 
 613. See, e.g., id. § 3110.5 (West Supp. 2001); CAL. RULES OF COURT § 1257.7 
(West 2001) (mandating annual training on domestic violence for custody 
evaluators). 
 614. In several of the appellate cases discussed above, the attorneys seemed to 
be unaware of the rebuttable presumption statute, as it was not raised at the trial 
court level.  While some states are considering including domestic violence issues 
on the general bar examination, so far no state has done so.  Thus, it is quite 
possible for family law attorneys to have had no training on domestic violence. 
 615. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16206 (West 2000) (mandating 
domestic violence training for court-appointed attorneys for children in juvenile 
court).  While these attorneys do not have the same role as guardians ad litem, 
these are similar functions.  Both groups should be mandated to have domestic 
violence training. 
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of the statute, how domestic violence is defined under the statute, 
how the presumption is raised, and how it is rebutted.616 
Time needs to be given to any concerns or disagreements on 
the part of the participants, as this is an important opportunity to 
discuss fundamental beliefs, necessary for any real attitudinal 
change.617  After participating in this very specific and 
comprehensive training, it is more likely that these actors will feel a 
higher level of comfort with the new statutes and more willing to 
apply them on a daily basis, rather than resisting the statutes due to 
feeling unsure of how to proceed or because they do not 
understand the basis for the presumption.618 
D.  Changing Roles of Family Court Services Staff, Mediators, Custody 
Evaluators, and Guardians ad Litem 
Yet another part of the solution may be changing the role of 
mediators employed by Family Court Services staff.  In many areas, 
the current job description is only to mediate between parents in 
contested custody cases.  However, increasingly courts are changing 
this to provide that these workers should screen for and then 
investigate any allegations of abuse.619  They could then report on 
their findings to the court.  Mediators are also sometimes directed 
to be aware of and refer litigants to community resources such as 
domestic violence shelters, legal assistance, and batterers 
programs.620  This type of service is invaluable in cases where the 
litigants have no attorneys, which is becoming the norm rather 
than the exception in family law cases.621 
 
 616. Such trainings have been provided for court-based mediators and child 
custody evaluators by the California Judicial Council.  For more information, 
contact Julia Weber at the Center for Families, Children, and the Courts, 
Administrative Office of the Courts, San Francisco, California.  They have also 
been provided for judges by the California Commission on Judicial Education and 
Research.  For more information contact Bobbie Welling, CJER, Administrative 
Office of the Courts, San Francisco, California. 
 617. This is recommended in a thoughtful article discussing how to actually 
effect attitudinal change in the family courts on the topic of domestic violence.  See 
Clare Dalton, When Paradigms Collide: Protecting Battered Parents and Their Children in 
the Family Court System, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 273 (July 1999). 
 618. Id. 
 619. See, e.g., CAL. RULE OF COURT, R1257.2, which is due to take effect Jan. 1, 
2002. 
 620. Id. 
 621. A 1997 study by the California Administrative Office of the Courts found 
that more than eighty percent of domestic violence cases are handled without 
attorneys.  Sharon Lerman, Litigants Without Lawyers Flood Courts, 1 CAL. BAR J. 32 
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Additionally, in areas where guardians ad litem have decision-
making power in custody cases, this role needs to be carefully 
examined and re-evaluated, as this may be an improper delegation 
of judicial authority.622  In these jurisdictions, legislation, rules of 
court, or standards of judicial administration need to be enacted 
clarifying the judicial role as opposed to the roles of other 
professionals in custody cases. 
E.  Increased Funding for Attorneys for Low Income Victims of 
Domestic Violence 
Due to the devastating funding cuts to the Legal Services 
Corporation under the twelve years of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 
the numbers of free or low cost attorneys available to help poor 
victims of domestic violence were greatly reduced.623  In custody 
cases involving domestic violence, victims are at a severe 
disadvantage if they are forced to represent themselves, but many 
have no choice.624 
If presumption statutes are to be effective, money must be 
found for attorneys to handle these complex cases at the trial level.  
Additionally, a widespread pro bono project among the private bar 
needs to be instituted.625  In some areas, these attorneys can be 
trained by and co-counsel with attorneys employed by Legal 
Services or local non-profit domestic violence agencies.626  While 
Congress has earmarked funds for many attorneys to work on civil 
domestic violence cases around the country,627 this is still a huge 
 
(2001). 
 622. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446 (describing an example of 
what may have been the improper delegation of such authority). 
 623. Steve Berenson, Politics and Plurality in a Lawyer’s Choice of Clients: The Case 
of Stropnicky v. Nathanson, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 49 (1998) (noting that the  
“[l]egal Services Corporation has barely survived elimination, suffering deep 
funding reductions and draconian restrictions on the scope of its activities”); 
Jessica Pearson, Court Services: Meeting the Needs of Twenty-First Century Families, 33 
FAM. L.Q. 617, 620 (1999) (observing that federal appropriations for these 
programs have been cut and that both government and private legal assistance 
meets only about 20.5 percent of the needs of the poor). 
 624. Lerman, supra note 6232. 
 625. For example, the Center for Domestic Violence Prevention, San Mateo, 
Ca., has been successfully recruiting and training attorneys from large firms to 
handle contested custody cases involving domestic violence at the trial level.  
Conversation with Kim Milligan, Attorney for C.D.V.P., Aug. 6, 2001. 
 626. Id. 
 627. The Violence Against Women Grants Office, part of the U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, has provided several million dollars in 1999, 2000 and 2001 to non-profit 
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and largely unmet need. 
F.  Using the Appellate Process 
In a great many of the appellate decisions discussed above, 
courts overturned inappropriate trial court decisions in custody 
cases involving domestic violence.  And in virtually all the reported 
appellate cases cited in this article, both parties were represented 
by counsel.  Appellate review is how problems with trial court 
decisions are supposed to be resolved.  Thus, our legal system is 
often ineffective if litigants have no access to the appellate courts. 
In too many cases, poor victims of domestic violence cannot 
afford to file appeals when the family court awards custody to the 
batterer.  While some Legal Aid agencies will take on such cases, 
many will not.628  Thus, funding must be found for private 
representation, or qualified pro bono attorneys must be recruited.  
Additionally, attorneys who routinely represent many victims at the 
trial court level must be trained to raise the presumption issue 
appropriately, laying the foundation for an appeal.  And these 
attorneys could be encouraged to appeal decisions that appear to 
be in violation of the statute. 
G.  Community Organizing 
In addition to the above recommendations, it is often 
necessary to organize members of the community before domestic 
violence is treated seriously in custody cases.  This effort may focus 
specifically on the legal community, or may include the larger non-
legal community. 
For example, in some cases, judicial training has been 
attempted but has not been successful; either it is not mandated, or 
when it is, few judges attend.629  Thus, another avenue being tried 
in some jurisdictions is a court watch program, in order to obtain 
systematic information about how domestic violence custody cases 
 
agencies around the U.S. to start meeting the civil needs of domestic violence 
victims, primarily focusing on family law cases. 
 628. Yetter E-mail, supra note 614.  Ms. Yetter says that Oregon Legal Aid has 
not taken any appeals of domestic violence custody cases.  Id.  She says the priority 
at Legal Aid is to take on cases which will create new law.  Id.  Of course, a well 
reasoned appellate decision interpreting a new statute could resolve a lot of 
interpretation problems at the trial court level and save Legal Services trial 
attorneys much time and trouble. 
 629. Post E-mail, supra note 526. 
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are handled at the trial court level.  Once this information is 
compiled and analyzed, the hope is that the presiding judge will be 
more willing to mandate training for the family law judges.630 
Another example of community organizing on this topic 
comes from Minnesota, where the Duluth Abuse Intervention 
Project recently conducted and published an extensive report 
regarding judicial response to domestic violence, then met with 
judicial leaders to discuss the findings in the report.631  While 
judges are barred by codes of ethics from discussing pending or 
specific cases, it is appropriate for them to examine the court’s 
response in the aggregate.  The response from the judiciary to this 
report and discussion has been positive.632 
Another way to organize and also to conduct informal training 
with attorneys and judges is to work closely with them on policy 
committees.  For example, when domestic violence attorneys join 
and participate in meetings with the family law section of the state 
bar, these “mainstream” attorneys become more knowledgeable 
about domestic violence issues, and may even become advocates for 
changing the laws.633 
An example of organizing within the larger community is an 
ongoing project taking place in Durban, Ontario, near Toronto, in 
Canada.  The domestic violence advocates there have used a 
community organizing model to address problems with custody 
cases involving domestic violence.634  They started with several focus 
 
 630. E-mail from Dianne Post, Attorney, Arizona Coalition Against Domestic 
Violence, to author, Professor of Law, University of California at  (July 9, 2001) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Post E-mail (3)].  Domestic violence court watch 
programs have been conducted in several states, though these usually focus on 
criminal cases.  See, e.g., Sarah Buel, Family Violence Court Watches: Improving Services 
to Victims by Documenting Practices, THE TEXAS PROSECUTOR 16 (July/Aug. 1999).  
Minnesota also has a domestic violence court watch program, focusing on criminal 
cases; the results are used to inform the public when the judges are running for re-
election.  Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 447.  For more information 
about court watch programs, contact the Battered Women’s Justice Project, 800-
903-0111. 
 631. Cook Telephone Conversation, supra note 446. 
 632. Id. 
 633. Fredrick Telephone Conversation, supra note 418.  Ms. Fredrick joined 
the family law section of the Minnesota State Bar and attended many of the 
meetings, raising domestic violence issues.  Id.  After a few years, the State Bar 
decided to sponsor the 2001 legislation extending the state rebuttable 
presumption to sole custody cases.  Id. 
 634. Deborah Sinclair, et al., In the Center of the Storm: Durham Speaks Out, A 
Community Response to Custody and Access Issues Affecting Woman Abuse Survivors and 
Their Children (June 2000) at http://www.durhamresponsetowomanabuse.com 
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groups of mothers who were involved in such cases, led by a social 
worker/researcher.635  The findings and recommendations from 
these groups were then used as the basis for an ongoing working 
group and conferences in which survivors, advocates, judges, 
custody assessors, and others are participating.636  The results so far 
have been quite promising.637 
VI. CONCLUSION 
“I have always embraced the idea that the pursuit of a worthy, 
deep goal is never for a day or for a year, that the journey is long 
and hard, and no one can say how long it will take.  You take in all 
the information you can, you decide what is right, and once you 
make the decision, you pursue it.  You commit, with perseverance, 
steadfastness and faith.”638 
Ending domestic violence is a monumental task.  Effecting any 
fundamental changes in the legal system takes great perseverance 
and creativity.  Enacting statutes creating presumptions against 
custody to batterers is not a “quick fix.”  It does not solve the 
problems presented in these cases overnight.  In some areas, it has 
actually produced a backlash, making it harder for victims to obtain 
restraining orders or limiting the effectiveness of such orders. 
However, these difficulties should not discourage states from 
enacting statutes creating a presumption against custody to 
batterers.  First, it appears that the courts that have been dealing 
with presumption statutes for the longest period of time seem to be 
using them most consistently.  It seems that making a change this 
fundamental takes many years. 
Second, these statutes are designed to protect victims and their 
children, and when applied appropriately, they accomplish this 
goal.  While fully implementing such statutes and dealing with the 
backlash in some jurisdictions will take a great deal of work, the 
end result is well worth it.  The ultimate goals include no longer 
enabling batterers to use the family law courts to continue to re-
victimize their partners, and exposing many fewer children to 
ongoing abuse and inappropriate parenting.  With steadfastness 
and ingenuity, we are slowly but surely moving in that direction. 
 
 635. Id. 
 636. Id. 
 637. Id. 
 638. CONGRESSMAN JOHN LEWIS WITH MICHAEL D’ORSO, WALKING WITH THE 
WIND: A MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT (1998). 
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